On the Theology of Plato — part 2

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Having therefore discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial and sublunary Gods, it now remains that we ascend to the summit or monad of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus, in whose divinity they all subsist and are rooted, similarly to the fixed stars in the inerratic sphere. For after this manner, every monad analogously contains its co-ordinate multitude.

Bacchus therefore, is the mundane intellect, from which the soul and body of the world are suspended. With respect however, to intellect it is necessary to observe that one kind is imparticipable and total; another is participate indeed but essentially so ; and a third is participate, and subsists as a habit. All intellects unconnected with soul belong to the first kind. The mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane Gods and beneficent daemons, rank in the second division. And to the third class such intellects as ours belong. This deity also is the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things, by whom he is said in divine fables to have been torn in pieces; because the mundane soul which participates df this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them distributed into every part of the universe. Plato in the Cratylus says of this divinity “ that he is the giver of wine ; and that oivog wine may most justly be denominated otovovg because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before.” On which words Proclus in his MS Scholia on that dialogue observes as follows : “ The young man Cratylus appears to inquire about our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates. 1 And he does not indeed pay attention to the occult, but only to the last and mundane progressions of the Gods. These indeed, the wise man venerates, though

* This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about great things.

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as he says, they are sports, through these Gods [Bacchus and Venus] being lovers of sport. For as he says of the terminations of the other Gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as for instance, that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, till she has entirely subverted them, their houses and cities;—in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce yXuxvflufua sweetness of sensation; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the Gods, and preparing us to understand that all things look to the best end, whatever it may be. For because the terminations of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and alleviate corporeal molestation, on this account the Gods thecauses of these things, are Qi>MxeuyiMns lovers of sport. Hence, of statues, they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation), but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously to • the mundane allotments of the Gods.

But theologists frequently call Bacchus wine, from the last of his gifts^ as for instance, Orpheus,

Oivou f«VT» ftcAy xoffbco kajk? xou jxoi mix*.

iv e. “ Take all the members of Wine [that are distributed] in the world, and bring them to me." If however the God is thus denominated, certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his last; so that Socrates now looking to this calls the God Mottwrog, beginning from wine, which as we have said manifests all the powers .of Bacchus. Thus also in the Phaedrus, Socrates calls Love in. common great , both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet wine therefore, we must understand that the peculiarity of a "partial intellect, is in common presented to our view. For the word o tow such as, is nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming participated, particular and Proc. Vo l. II. 2 £

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alone. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable sameness: but a partial and participated intellect, is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the peculiarity of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect* such as, and particular. (<nj/xau»»v rov #«ov xai met pour)

Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is suspended from the Dionysiacal or Bacchic monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect, (or that intellect which ranks as a whole) many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper wholenesses; on this account theologists call both this God and all his fabrications wine. For all these are the progeny of intellect. And some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them; in body indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication. For in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the heart of the God is said to have alone uemained undistributed, i. e. the indivisible or impartible essence of intellect.

With respect to the mundane soul which is the immediate participant of this Bacchic intellect, the composition of it is most accurately delivered by Plato in the Timaeus, and admirably unfolded by Proclus in his Commentaries on that dialogue. For full information therefore on this subject I refer the reader to those works; and shall only summarily observe at present that there are five genera of being, from which all things after the first being are composed; viz. essence, permanency, motion, sameness, and difference. For every thing must possess essence; must abide in its cause, from which also it must proceed, and to which it must be converted; must be the same with itself and certain other natures, and. at the same time different from others, and distinguished in itself. But Plato for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composir tion of the mundane soul, viz. essence, sameness, and difference; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. When

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therefore Plato says, “that from aa essence impartible* and always subsisting according lo sameness of being, and from a nature divisible about bodies, the demiurgus mingled from both a third form of essence, having a middle subsistence between the two,”—by the impartible essence lie means intellect, and by the nature which is divisible about bodies, a corporeal life. Hence the mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, and yet a participant of each. In short, the intellect participated by soul, is called by Plato impartible; but the nature which is divisible about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is analogous to the Sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light.

Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they arte conformable to the Orphic traditions. “ For, says he,' Orpheus does not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names. For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where, therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible, in order that we may understand the divine conception of Platoi* Orpheus therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication, analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number of sonls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed (i. e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that all his other

* In Tim. p. 18 *.

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fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible, being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in One intellection;—this being the case, he says that the intellectual essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva. For says he.

The intellectual heart alone was left,

directly calling it intellectual.

If therefore the impartible heart is intellectual, it will evidently be intellect and an intellectual number; not indeed every intellect, but the mundane; for this is the impartible heart, since the divided God was also the fabricator of this. Orpheus therefore calls the impartible essence of Bacchus intellect. But he denominates the life which is divisible about body, which is physical, and pregnant with seeds, the genitals of the God. And ,he says that Diana who presides over all the generation in nature, and is the midwife of physical productive principles, extends these genitals, distributing as far as to subterranean natures, the prolific power iof the God. But all the remaining body of Bacchus was, he says, the psychical essence, this also being divided into seven parts. For they divided all the seven parts of the boy, says the theologist, speaking of the Titans; just as Timaeus divides the soul into seven parts. And perhaps Timseus, when he says that soul is extended through the whole world, will remind the followers of Orpheus of the Titannic division, through which soul is not only spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended through it. Very properly therefore, does Plato call the essence which is proximately above soul, an impartible essence. And in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by soul, following the Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were an interpreter of what is said in the mysteries.” And thus much concerning Bacchus, or the monad of the mundane Gods.

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CHAPTER XXXIV.

Ik the next place let us direct our attention to the Parmenides of Plato,

' and see how in that most theological dialogue the mundane Gods are Characterized. In the first hypothesis therefore of that dialogue, in which all the divine orders are denied of the one , Parmenides characterizes the mundane Gods by the equal and the unequal as follows: “But since the one is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to another. How so ? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or less than the things with which it is commensurate^ will possess more measures than the less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of less; and with respect to the other of greater measures. How should it not ? Is it not therefore impossible that a thing which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same? It is impossible. It will therefore neither be equal to itself nor to another if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will he of as many parts as there are measures; and so again, it will no longer be the one t but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure. It has, however, appeared that the one cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. The one , therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nOr of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of same) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or less either than itself or another. It is in every jespect so.”

As the commentary of Prod us on the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, in which the equal and the unequal are affirmed of the one, is

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lost, and in which I have no doubt, the properties of the mundane Gods were most fully unfolded, I shall present the reader with the following extract from his commentary on the above passage in the Parmenides of Plato. The peculiarity of the mundane Gods is the equal and the unequal, the former of these indicating their fulness, and their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which they contain. Tor in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to ancient tfaeologists, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timseus also constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily presubsist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls. And as all analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the peculiarity of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he now rightly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal and the unequal from sameness and the many , and not from the similar and the dissimilar , though immediately before he spoke of these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and the first multitude which he denies of the one.

Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things of which demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars about 'Which Parmenides discourses; so that the equal and the unequal , so far as tlrey proceed from the one , and subsist through sameness and the many , so far through these they are denied of the one. Hence, Plato thus begins his discussion of them:—“ But since it (viz. the one) is such," i. e. not as we have just now demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, that it neither receives same nor different, and is mthout multitude, —being such, it is neither equal nor unequal, neither to itself, nor to others. For again, there are here twofold conclusions, in the same manner as concerning the similar and the dissimilar, and the same and the different. But that the equal and the unequal are suspended from the twofold co-ordinations of divine natures is not immanifest. For the equal is arranged under the similar and the same , subsistence in another , the round, and the whole; but the unequal, under the dissimilar, the different ,

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subsistence in itself, the straight , and the possession of parts . And again, of these the former are suspended from bound, but the latter from infinity. Plato also appears to produce the discourse through certain oppositions; as it were, that he may show* that the one is above all opposition. For the one cannot be the worse of the two opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be the better of the two, since in this case it would not be the cause of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, nor permanency to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the better to the worse.

It is, however, by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of the equal and the unequal , which are here assumed as symbols of mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary natures, that they may show that the one of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All such axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal and unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, as it contains many powers, some of which are co-ordinate with each other, and extend themselves to the self-perfect and the good , but others differ according to transcendency and subjection — the former must be said to be characterized by equality , but the latter by inequality. For the good is the measure of every thing : and hence such things as are united by the same good are measured by the same measure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progression according to the unequal.

Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings. For thus, in throgs com-’

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mens urate, the less is willing to have a common measure with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion proceeding from first to partial and multifarious natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, the equal and the Unequal are symbols of the mundane Gods, the commensurate and the incommensurate are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition lias no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a material subject, and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and matter, a division appears in them* according to the equal and the unequal.

CHAPTER XXXV.

After the mundane Gods, the scientific order of discussion requires that we should consider divine souls, and the triple genera of natures more excellent than man, viz. angels, daemons, and heroes. Previous, however, to this, that I may as much as possible unfold to the reader the whole of the Platonic theory about the Gods, I shall present him with a developement of the nature of certain other divinities mentioned by Plato; and 'which, owing to the loss of the seventh book of Proclus, and of other theological works of the most genuine Platonists, cannot at this remote and barren period be scientifically classed.

In the first place, then, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in the Pheedrus of Boreas and Orithya, the Centaurs, Chimaeras, Gorgons r

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Pegasuses, Typhons, Achclous, and the Nymphs, accompanied with the elucidations of Ammonius Hermeas. “ Phaedr. Inform me, Socrates, whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have ravished Orithya from Ilissu9. Soc. It is reported so indeed. Phaedr. Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to the sports of virgins. Soc. It was not, but two or three stadia lower down, where we meet with the temple of Diana, and in that very place there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas. Phaedr. I did not perfectly know this. But tell me by Jupiter, Socrates, are you persuaded that this fabulous narration is true? Soc. If I should not believe in it, as is the case with the wise, I should not be absurd : and afterwards, speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from the neighbouring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report, that she was not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, Phsedrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to correct the shape of the Centaurs, and Chimsera. And besides this, a crowd of Gorgons and Pegasuses will pour upon him for an exposition of this kind, and of certain other prodigious natures, immense both in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most abundant leisure. With respect to myself, indeed, I have not leisure for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, aud being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned respecting them, I do not contemplate these, butmyself, considering whether I -am not a wild beast, possessing more folds than Typhon, and far more raging and Proe. Voi,, II. 2 F

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fierce; or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally parti* cipating of a certain divine and modest condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse arrived at our destined seat ? And is not yonder the oak to which you were to lead Us? Phaedr. That indeed is it. Soc. By Juno, a beautiful retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, and is remarkably tall ; and the height and opacity of the willow, are perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odour. Add too, that a most pleafcant fountain of extreme cool water flows under the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and which appears to be sacred to Certain Nymphs, and to Achelous, from the virgins and statues with which it is adorned.”

On this very beautiful passage, Hermes comments as follows: The Athenians established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods signify their allotments; as you may also call this mundane body, or apparent solar orb, the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun.

With respect to the fable, a two-fold solution may be given of it; one from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. And the former of these is as follows : Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, which the.telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, the God was so very propitious, tliht he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as a human being (for animals cease to energize according to their own peculiarities when possessed by superior causes) died under the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.

But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, is as follows, and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often employ

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transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline of wholes. They say, then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the presiding deity of ’ Attica alone. Of this deity, Orithya is the daughter. And she is the prolific power of the earth, which is indeed co-extended with the word Erectheus , as the unfolding of the name signifies. For it is the prolific power of the earth flourishing and restored according to the seasons . But Boreas is the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures; for the providence of the Gods in the world is signified by Boreas, because this divinity blows from lofty places. But the elevating power of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the south are more divine.. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to ascend, and pro*ceed into the apparent.

Orithya, also, may be said to be a soul' aspiring after things above, from opoum and d«<», according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an m. Such a soul, therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a. precipice, this also is appropriate. For such a soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons a proairetic , 1 at the same time that she lives a physical life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phaedo, is nothing else than a meditation of death.

According to some, however, Socrates in what he here says about Orithya and Boreas does not admit the explanation of fables. But it is Evident that he frequently does admit and employ fables. Now, indeed, he blames those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth,

* This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting fables. See my translation of Sallust On the Gods and the World.

* This is a life pertaining to her own will; for die soul in this case gives herself up to the wQi of divinity.

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and winds,-which da not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine concerns. Hence, Socrates now says. If unfolding this fable I should recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas,—should I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the mse, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, but to natures, and winds, airs and vortices, as he also says in the Phsedo. He Rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus explain this fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man very curious and laborious , and not entirely happy, these words indicate the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the Centaurs, Chimseras, Gorgons, and Pegasuses, are powers which preside over a material nature, and the region about the earth.'

When Socrates also says, that he is not yet able to know himself, his meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not yet know himself, as he is known by divinity. For if ever any man knew himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates.

When likewise he says, “ I do not contemplate these, but myself;” this is because he who knows himself knows all things. For in consequence of the soul being xa/A/Mg<pov ayax/ta an omniform image, he beholds all things in himself. But by Typhon here we must understand that power which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, or in other words over the last procession of things. The term manifold , therefore, in this place, must not be applied to the God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own natpre moved in a confused, dis-

' For an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the second Book of the Republic, in VoL I. of my translation of Plato.

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ordered, and manifold manner. For it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of providential care to the providing powers themselves.

Farther still, Socrates mentions Juno, as generating and adorning the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have received the Cestiis from Venus. But Achelous is the deity who presides over the much-honoured power of water. For by this mighty river, the God who is the inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. And Nymphs are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. But this Bacchus supplies the regeneration of the whole sensible world.

I shall only add, that Nymphs according to Servius on the first iEneid are distributed into three classes. But Nymphs belonging to. mountains are called Oreades; to woods, Dryades; those that are born with woods, Hamadryades ; those that belong to fountains, Napae, or Naiades; and those that belong to the sea. Nereides.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Again, the following divinities are also mentioned by Plato in different parts of his works. In the first place, Pan, at the end of the Phaedrus; to which divinity Socrates addresses the following admirable prayer: “ O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are residents of this place, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever 1 possess externally may be friendly to my inward attainments! Grant also, that I may consider the wise man as one who abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage!” In this prayer, by Pan and the other Gods, we must understand local deities under the moon. But

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Pan is denominated as it were all, because he possesses the most ample sway in the order of local Gods. For as the supermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celestial to Bacchus, so all the sublunary local Gods and daemons are referred to Pan.

In the next place, Tartarus is mentioned by Plato in the Phsedo, as one of the greatest chasms of the earth; and of which, says lie, Homer' thus speaks:

Far, very far, where under earth U found

Ji gulf, of every depth, die most profound.

But Tartarus, says Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the universe, and subsists oppositely to Olympus. It is also a deity, the inspective guardian of that which is last in every order. Hence, there is a celestial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a Saturnian Tartarus, in which likewise Saturn concealed his offspring; and also a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic.

Again, the characteristic peculiarity of Prometheus, as mentioned by Plato in the Gorgias, is thus unfolded by Olympiodorus in his MS. Scholia on that dialogue: Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls. For to exert a providential energy is the employment of the rational soul, and, prior to any thing else, to know itself. Irrational natures indeed perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, Epimetheus is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But fire signifies the rational soul itself; because, as fire tends upwards, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen ? Because that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Hence, since the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this

1 Iliad, lib. viii.

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account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed ? Because a reed is full of cavities, and therefore signifies the flowing body in which the soul is carried. But why was the fire stolen contrary to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on bigh; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents indeed the superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wishes the soul always to abide on high. But the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend: Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made. And what else is this than the vTational soul , which is of a feminine characteristic? For as it was necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence she becomes united with it through the irrational soul. But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive take place through the celestial bodies. 1

Again, in the Phaedo, mention is made by Plato of Cadmus, who, according to Olympiodorus, is the sublunary world, as being Dionysiacal, on which account Harmonia or Harmony is united to the God, and also as being the father of the four Bacchuses. The four dements likewise he informs us are said to be Dionysiacal, viz. jire to be Semele; earth, Agave, tearing in pieces her own offspring; water, lno ; and lastly, air, Autonoe. There is great beauty in conjoining Harmony, the daughter of Venus and Mars, with Cadmus. For Venus, as we have before observed, is the came of all the harmony and analogy in the universe, and beautifully illuminates the order and communion of all mundane concerns. But Mars excites the contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. The progeny, therefore, of these two divinities must be the concordant discord, or harmony of the sublunary world.

1 For the irrational soul is an immaterial body, or in other words, vitalized extension , such as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of this kind.

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Farther still, the Syrens are mentioned by Plato, both in the 10th book of the Republic, and in the Cratylus. And Proclus, in the 6th book of this work, has explained the meaning of what Plato says of them in the former of those dialogues. But in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus he says, “ The divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens ; the celestial, which is under the government of Jupiter; that which produces generation, and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is cathartic, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline all things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the soul is in the heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are Gods, daemons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.”

CHAPTER XXXVII.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to Plato’s theological conceptions of Nature, Fate, and Fortune. From the Timaeus, therefore, it appears that Plato does not consider either matter, or material form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called Nature, though it has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper to call Nature soul; but establishing its essence between soul and corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to itself, but as surpassing the latter through containing the productive principles, and generating

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and vivifying every part of the visible world. For Nature verges towards bodies, and is inseparable from their fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in herself, and subsists- both from herself and another; from another, that is, from intellect through participation ; and from herself, on account of not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, aud at the same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary life. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal and sensible world; bounds the progressions of incorporeal essences; and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs mundane afiaits. And stie is a Goddess indeed considered as deified, and not according to the primary signification of the word; for divine bodies also are called Gods, as beihg the statues or images of the Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers; by her summit comprehending the heavens ; but through heavetf governing generation. And she every where weaves partial natures in amicable conjunction with wholes.

Nature, however, thus subsisting, she proceeds from the Vivific Goddess Rhea; (for 44 immense Nature, says the Chaldean oracle, is suspended from the shoulders of the Goddess;”) from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the subjects of its government. But Nature being from thence suspended, she pervades through and inspires all things without impediment. Hence, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and corruptible natures remain perpetually in the world, being connected and comprehended by the causes of forms which she contains. And those indeed who call Nature demiurgic art, if they mean by this the Nature which abides in the demiurgus himself, tl»ey do not speak rightly; but if they mean that which proceeds from him, their conception is accurate. For art must be considered as having a three-fold subsistence; one, that which does not proceed out of the artist; the second, that which proceeds indeed, but is converted to him; and the third, that which has now proceeded, and has its subsistence in something else. The art, therefore, which is in the demiurgus, abides indeed in him; but the intellectual soul is art, yet at the same time both abiding and proceeding. And Proc. Vol. II, 2 G

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Nature is art, alone proceeding into something different from herself. Hence, she is said to be the organ of the Gods, not deprived of life, nor alter-motive alone, but having in a certain respect, a self-motive power, in consequence of energizing from herself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious powers, are vital, and concur with their energies. And thus much concerning Nature according to the conceptions of Plato, as unfolded by Proclus.

In the next place with respect to Fate, in the fable in the Politicus, Plato says, that “ Fate and connate desire convolve the world, when it is considered by itself as a corporeal nature, without the intellectual Gods." And in the Timaeus he represents the demiurgus exhibiting to souls the nature of the universe, and announcing to them the laws of Fate. On which Proclus admirably comments as follows: It must not be said, that Pate is a partial nature, as some of the Peripatetics assert it is; as for instance, Alexander; for such a nature is imbecil and not perpetual. For from common conceptions, we pre-assume that the power of Fate is something very great and stable. Nor must it be said, that it is the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle asserts it to be, who denominates the increase which is contrary to order preterfatal, as if order and Fate were the same. For the cause of order is one thing, but order itself is another. Nor is it soul subsisting in habitude, as Theodorus says; for such a form of life in wholes is not a principle. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many things which are supernatural, and out of the dominion of Nature are produced by Fate, such as nobility, renpwn, and wealth. For where is it seen that physical motions become the cause of these? Nor is it the intellect of the universe, as again Aristotle says in a certain place, if the treatise On the World was written by him. For intellect produces every thing which it produces at once, and is not at all in yvant of an administration which proceeds according to a certain period, and a continued and well-ordered series of things. But the chain, the order, the periodic production of many causes constitute the peculiarity of Fate.

If, however, it be requisite to comprehend the whole form of it concisely, we must say, that ^subject matter as it were of it is Nature herself, but

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considered as deified, and filled with divine, intellectual, and. psychical illuminations. For the order of Gods called the presidents of destiny, (rcuv fiotpyytToir xa\oofitva>v) and the genera that are more excellent than man terminate in Nature. For these impart powers from themselves to the one life of Nature; and the demiurgus of wholes collects and unites all these gifts, and demonstrates them to be one power. For if visible bodies [i. e. the celestial bodies], are filled with divine ' powers, Nature, is by a much greater priority divine. And if the whole visible world is one, much more is the whole essence of Fate one, and derives from many causes the completion of its composition. For being suspended from the providence of the Gods, and from demiurgic goodness, it is united and governed by it, being a productive principle subsisting from productive principles, one multiform power, a divine life, and an order of things that have a prior arrangement. Hence, the ancients looking to this its various and multiform nature, were led to form different opinions concerning it. And some indeed said that it is a Goddess, on account of that which is divine in it; others, that it is a daemon, on account of the efficacious and at the same time multiform nature of its production; others, that it is intellect, because a certain participation of intellect reaches it; but others, that it is order, so that every thing which has an arrangement is invisibly comprehended by it. Plato, however, alone surveyed the essence of it, asserting indeed that it is Nature, but Nature suspended from the demiurgus. For how could the demiurgus exhibit Nature to souls, otherwise than by containing the principle of it in himself? And how could he announce to them the laws of Fate, after exhibiting to them the Nature of the universe, except by constituting Nature as the one power that comprehends these laws ?

Farther still, in the Politicus, Plato more clearly suspends the second life of the universe from Fate, after the departure of the one daemon, that governed it, and the many daemons that were the followers of that one. Hence, he separates all the providential care of these powers from

■ It is necessary here to supply the word

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the universe, and alone leaves it the government according to Fate; the world, indeed, always possessing both these, but the fable separating the first from the second. For he says, “ that Fate and connate desire convolve the world,” just as the Chaldaean oracles say, “ that unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward in 'order that the heavens may run an eternal course; and that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night and day may be accomplished,” Thus, therefore, Plato also says, that the second period of the world is convolved by Fate, and not the first and intellectual period, all but clearly asserting that Fate is the power which proximately moves the sensible world, and is suspended from the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing Necessity the mother of the Fates prior to these, he represents her in the Republic convolving ‘ the world on her knees. And if it be requisite to give my opinion* Plato arranges these three causes of order successive to each other, vie. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. For the demiurgus as Orpheus says, was nourished indeed by Adrastia, but associated with Necessity, and generated Fate. And as Adrastia was comprehensive of divine institutions, 1 and the collector of alhvarious laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane laws, which the demiurgus now inscribes in souls, that he may lead them in conjunction with wholes, and may define what is adapted to them according to the different elections of lives. Hence, a vicious life tends to that which is dark and atheistical, but a pious life leads the soul to the heavens to which she is also conducted by wholes ; because each, of these lives is full of the Jpws of Fate; and souls lead themselves, as Plotinus says, thither where the law that is in them announces. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the Gods, to conduct inwardly the subjects for which it provides. And why is it wonderful that this should be the case, since Nature also inserting material and corporealformed powers in bodies, moves them through these powers; earth indeed

*' Tor r;i$u here, it is necessary to read rrgipi. * For here raad W/tusv.

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through gravity, but fire through levity. In a much greater degree, therefore, do the Gods move souls through the powers which they disseminate in them. Hence, if they lead souls according to die laws of Fate, these laws also subsist in souls. And they pre-exist indeed intellectually in the demiurgus ; for the divine law is established with him. But they exist in divine souls; for according to these laws they govern the universe. And they are participated by partial souls; for through these they conduct themselves to an appropriate place, themselves moving themselves. And through deliberate choice,, indeed, they act erroneously and with rectitude; but through law they distribute to themselves an order adapted to their former conduct.

In the last place with respect to Fortune, it is necessary to observe that Plato does not assert as the Stoics do, that the worthy man has no need of the assistance of this divinity; but he is of opinion that the energies of our reasoning power, since according to their external progression they are complicated with corporeal energies, require the inspiration of good Fortune, m order that they may be prosperous* and benefit others. Hence in the Timaeus and the Parmenides, the persons of the dialogues, are represented as meeting together through a certain good Fortune. And in the Laws he says, that God, and after God 1 , Fortune and Time govern all human affairs. “ Fortune, therefore,” says Proclus/ “ and- her gifts, are not things destitute of design and indefinite ; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, and which adorns things disordered, and gives completion to the allotments assigned to every thing from the universe.” According to Sallust in his elegant treatise On the Gods and the World, “^Fortune must be considered as a power of the Gods, disposing things differing from each other, and happening contrary to expectation, to beneficent purposes.” He adds, “ On this account it is proper that cities should celebrate this Goddessin common ; since every city is composed of different particulars. But this Goddess holds her dominion in sublunary concerns, since every thing fortuitous is excluded from the regions above the moon.”

v

.*■ In Tim. p. <9.

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In conformity to this, Simplicius also, in his Commentary On the Physics of Aristotle,' admirably observes concerning Fortune as follows : “ The power of Fortune particularly disposes in an orderly manner the sublunary part of the universe, in which contingencies subsist, and which being essentially disordered. Fortune, in conjunction with other primary Causes, directs, places in order, and governs. Hence she is represented guiding a rudder, because she governs things sailing on the sea of generation, Her rudder too is fixed on a globe, because she directs that which is unstable in generation. In her other hand, she holds the horn of Amalthea, which is full of fruits, because she is the cause of obtaining all divine fruits. And on this account, we venerate the fortunes of cities and houses, and of each individual; because being very remote from divine union, we are in danger of being deprived of its participation, and require in order to obtain it the assistance of the Goddess Fortune, and of those natures' superior to the human who possess the characteristic of this divinity. Indeed, every fortune is good ; for every attainment respects something good, nor does any thing evil subsist from divinity. But of things that are good, some are precedaneous, and others are of a punishing or revenging characteristic, which we are accustomed to call evils. Hence we speak of two Fortunes, one of which we denominate Good, and which is the cause of our obtaining precedaneous goods, but the other Evil, which prepares us to receive punishment or revenge” And thus much concerning Fortune.

* Lib. ii. p. 81.

* i, e. Angel*, daemons, and heroes,

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

It remains that we should consider in the next place, what Time, Day and Night, Month and Year are, so far as they are deities, according to the theology of Plato; the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus fortunately presenting us with much valuable information respecting the nature of these divinities. The speculation also of Time in this place will be very appropriate, as immediately after, the discussion of divine souls, angels, daemons and heroes will naturally follow, with whose essence Time is intimately and inseparably connected. Plato therefore in the Timaeus says, “ that while the demiurgus was adorning and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an eternal image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one ; and which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this he fabricated the generation of days and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with it rose into existence^ And all these indeed, are the proper parts of Time.” Proclus' in commenting on what Plato here says about Time, after having shown that it is neither any thing belonging to motion, nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of soul, investigates what it is in tiie following admirable manner:

“ Perhaps, says he, it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend its peculiarity. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is an intellect not only abiding but also subsisting in motion? Abiding indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity possessing permanency, both

1 Lib. iv. p. 240, &c.

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according to its inward energy, and that which it exerts to things eternal. Time being assimilated to it, according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect to the essence of the 6oul, we say that it is intelligible and at the same time generated, partible, and at the same time impartible, and are no otherwise able to apprehend its middle nature than by employing after a manner opposites, what wonder is there if, perceiving the nature of Time to be partly immoveable, and partly subsisting in motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philosopher, through the eternal , should indicate its intellectual monad abiding in sameness, and through the moveable its externally proceeding energy, which is participated by soul and the whole world ? For we must not think that the expression the eternal simply indicates that Time is the image of eternity; for if this were the case, what would have hindered Plato from directly saying that it is the image, and not the eternal image of eternity ? But he was willing to indicate this very thing, that time has tin eternal nature, but not in such a manner as animal itself [the paradigm of the universe] is said to be eternal. For that is eternal both in essence and energy; but Time is partly eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. Hence theurgists call it eternal; and Plato very properly denominates it not only so. For one thing is alone moveable, both essentially and according to the participants of it, being alone the cause of motion, as soul, and hence it alone moves itself and other things; but another thing is alone immoveable, preserving itself without transition, and being the cause to other things of a perpetual subsistence after the same manner, and to moveable natures through soul. It is necessary therefore, that the medium between these two extremes should be that which, both according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, is immoveable and at the same time moveable, essentially immoveable indeed, but moved in its participants. A thing however of tbis kind is Time.

Hence Time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immoveable; but so far as it is in ,its participants, it is moveable, and subsists together with them, unfolding itself into them. It is therefore, eternal, and a

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monad and center essentially, and according to its own abiding energy; but it is at the same time, continuous, and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence, it is a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, and on this account is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise contribute to the assimilation of mundane natures to more perfect paradigms, unless it were itself previously suspended from them. But it proceeds and abundantly flows, into the things which are guarded by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgists celebrate Time as a God, as Julian in the seventh of the Zones, and venerate it by those names, through which it is unfolded in its participants, causing some things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things in a circle. Time therefore, possessing a certain intellectual nature, circularly leads according to number, both its other participants and souls. For Time is eternal, not in essence only, but also in its inward energy ; but so far as it is participated by externals, it is alone moveable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it imparts. But every soul is transitively moved, both according to its inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. And it appears to me that those who thus denominated Time xt ov °s had this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as it were Xogauovrof voug, an intellect moving in measure; but dividing the words, perhaps for the sake of concealment, they called it Perhaps too,

they gave it this appellation because it abides and is at the same time moved in measure; by one part of itself abiding, and by the other proceeding with measured motion. By the conjunction therefore of both these, they signify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of this God. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual began from intellect to adorn the universe, so Time being itself supermundane, began from soul to impart perfection. For that Time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, the paradigm of the universe, so is Time to the world, which is animated and illuminated by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itself, in the same manner as Time of eternity. And thus much Proc. Vol. II. 8 H

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concerning Time, according to its first subsistence, and considered as a God.

With respect to Day and Night, according to their more principal subsistence, they are demiurgic measures of Time, exciting and convolving all the apparent and unapparent life and motion, and orderly distribution of the inerratic sphere. For these are the true parts of Time, are present after the same manner to all things, and comprehend the primary cause of apparent day and night, each of these having a different subsistence in apparent time; to which also Timaeus looking reminds us how time was generated together with the world. Hence he says in the plural number nights and days, and also months and years. But these are obvious to all men. For the unapparent causes of these have a uniform subsistence prior to things multiplied, and which circulate infinitely. Things immoveable also subsist prior to such as are moved, and intellectual natures are prior to sensibles. Such therefore, must be our conceptions of N ight and Day according to their first subsistence.

By Month we must understand that truly divine temporal measure which convolves the lunar sphere, and every termination of the circulation about the zodiac. But Year is that which perfects and connects the whole of middle fabrication, according to which the Sun is seen possessing the greatest strength, and measuring all things in conjunction with Time. For neither Day nor Night, nor Month is without the Sun, nor much more Year, nor any other mundane nature. I do not here speak according to the apparent fabrication of things alone; for the apparent Sun is the cause of these measures; but also according to that fabrication which is unapparent. For, ascending higher, we shall find that the more true Sun 1 measures all things in conjunction with Time, being itself in reality Time of Time, according to the Chaldaean oracle concerning it. For that Plato not only knew these apparent parts of Time, but also those divine parts to which these are homonymous, is evident from the 10th book of his Laws. For he there asserts that we call Hours and Months divine, as having the same divine lives, and divine intellects

' Viz. the Sun considered as subsisting in the supermundane order of Gods.

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presiding over them, as the universe. Let these therefore be the parts of Time, of which some are accommodated to the inerratic Gods, others to the Gods that revolve about the poles of the oblique circle, and others to other Gods, or attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals, or the more sublime or more abject parts of the universe.

Farther still, concerning Night and Day, Plato afterwards says, “ that through these, the period of one most wise circulation [i. e. the circulation of the inerratic sphere,] was produced on which Proclus observes as follows: “It may be doubted how Plato calls Night and Day the measure of the circulation of this sphere. For this measure is every where, originating supernally from the one intelligible cause of the universe, and the first paradigm ; but in the sublunary region it is the space of day and night. In answer to this, it must be said that the temporal interval which first subsists in the circulation of the inerratic sphere, and the solar light are productive of the nycthemeron or space of day and night. From the last of things therefore, and which are known to us, the whole measure is defined. For this nycthemeron is one thing, but another that which subsists in unapparent time. And the former is the image and ultimate termination of the latter. For there are many orders of Night and Day, intelligible and intellectual, supermundane, celestial and sublunary, as we are taught by the Orphic theology. And some of these indeed, are prior to fabrication ; but others are comprehended in it; and others proceed from it. Some also are unapparent, but others are apparent. For with respect likewise to Month and Year, one order of these is unapparent, measures, connectedly contains, and gives perfection to the intellectual and corporeal periods of the sun and moon; but another is apparent, which terminates and is the measure of the solar revolution. Thus too in the other Gods, the unapparent Saturnian number is one thing, and the apparent another. And in a similar manner the unapparent and apparent Martial, Jovian and Mercurial numbers differ from each other. For with respect to Month and Year, each of these being one according to each period, and always the same, is a certain God, immoveably bounding the measure of motion. For whence have the periods alwaj's an invariable sameness, except from a

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certain immoveable cause ? And whence do they derive the difference of their restitutions to their pristine state, except from different immoveable causes ? Whence also the unceasing, and the again and again to infinity, except from the infinite powers they contain ? But Plato considering all this series as temporal, arranges it under one and that the first Time, which defines the periodic time of a perpetually circulating body, and is, as we have before observed, true number. From these invisible causes however, we must conceive the visible periodic times are derived, proceeding from them according to that which is numbered, since they are able both to number and generate them. And in all these astronomy beautifully instructs us, doxastically apprehending the number of the periodic restitutions of each; and making comparisons of the ratios of the periods to each other; such as that the Saturnian period, is the double and a half of the period of Jupiter, and in a similar manner of the rest. For though their restitutions differ, yet they have a ratio to each other. Sacred rumour also venerates the unapparent causes of these, proclaiming the divine names of Night and Day, and also the causes that constitute, and the invocations, and self-manifestations of Month and Year. Hence, they are not to be surveyed superficially, but as having a subsistence in divine hyparxes. And these the laws of sacred institutions, and the oracles of Apollo ordered to be worshiped and honoured by statues and sacrifices, as histories inform us. When these also are reverenced, mankind are supplied with the benefits arising from the periods of the Seasons, and of the other divinities in a similar manner; but a preternatural disposition of every thing about the earth, is the consequence of the worship of these being neglected.” 1 Plato likewise in the Laws proclaims that all these are Gods, viz. the Seasons, Years and Months, in the same manner as the stars and the sun; and

1 << But we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem: for then had we plenty of victuals , and were well , and saw no evil. But since we left off to bum incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, we have wanted all things , and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine.” Jeremiah. Chap. xliv. v. 17, IB.

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we do not introduce any thing new by thinking it proper to direct our attention to the unapparent powers of these prior to those that are apparent.” And thus much concerning Time, Day and Night, Month and Year, considered according to their first subsistence, by which they are Gods.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

After the Gods, it is necessary in the next place to consider the order of divine souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods. This order, Plato in the Parmenides denies of the one as follows : “ Does it appear that the one can be either older or younger, or be of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself, or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted the one does not participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How therefore being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing ? It can in no respect. The one therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not therefore, be impossible that the one should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older, always older than the younger? What then? Hence that which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you say ? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in becoming to be different from another, when it is already different, but that it should be now different from that which is different,

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have been from that which was , and will be from that which is to be hereafter. But from that which is becoming to be different, it ought neither to have been , nor to be hereafter , nor to be, but to subsist in becoming to be different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is becoming to be older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in becoming to be younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in becoming to be in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter ; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in becoming to be , should be, have been , and be hereafter. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to the one. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed according to the decisions of reason."

Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from the one , through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to the one , from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from the one the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both true being , and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; in like manner from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that the one is exempt from, and therefore produces this essence.

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And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, and this by showing that the one does not participate of time. For it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which are measured by time. The one also is better than, and is beyond intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonstrated that the one neither stands still, nor is moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz. the one , intellect , and soul, become, known to us. But that the one is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it is neither older nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of these ; so that by showing that the one is exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that the one has no connexion with time. This, however, is incredible to the many, and appeared so to the physiologists prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immoveable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place, but motion time. As, therefore, it was demonstrated that the one is not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal, —in like manner through these arguments it is also shown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul, nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either according to essence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our observation that Parmenides no longer stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. the older, the younger , and the possession of the same age, though he might have said dyadically, of an equal

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age, and of an unequal age , as there the equal and the unequal. But there indeed having previously introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timaeus says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said imitating, begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For, the older and the younger , and the possession of the same age , are doubled, being divided into itself and relation to another. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order is not immanifest. For the triple nature of soul, consisting of essence , same and different , and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phaedrus,' evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.

It is likewise necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, Time according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,—not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the Time which is now denied of the one. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this Time. For it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This Time also is indeed essentially an intellect, as we have before observed ; but it is the cause to divine souls, of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which these likewise are

* In this dialogue, Plato assimilates the intimate form of the soul to a winged chariot and charioteer, drawn by two horses; and says, “ that all the horses and chariots of the Gods are good, and composed of things that are good.” In which passage, by the chariots of the Gods are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of their souls, which pursue the intelligence of all things, and can at the same time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. But the horses signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. And the wings are elevating powers, which particularly belong to the charioteer, or intellect.

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led to the older and to the same age : and this in a twofold respect. For the older in these* with respect to themselves takes place, so far as with their more excellent powers they enjoy in a greater degree the infinity of Time, and participate it more abundantly. For they are not filled with similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these divine souls srith respect to other things is effected, so far as some of these receive the whole measure of Time, and the whole of its extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial periods. Those therefore are older, whose period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be older and at the same time younger toith respect to themselves , by becoming hoary as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of Time, but juvenile beneath, by enjoying Time more partially. But, as with respect to others , they fnay be said to be older and at the same time younger according to a diminution of energy. For that which has its circulation measured by a less period is younger than that whose circulation is measured by a more extended period.

Again, among things co-ordinate, that which has the same participation and the same measure of perfection with othere may be said to be of the same age with itself and others. But every divine soul, though its own period is measured according to one Time, and that of the body which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own Time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous. By thus interpreting what is now said of the one , we shall accord with Plato in the Timeeus, who there evinces that Time is the measure of every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with his assertion in the Phaedrus, that souls see true being through Time, because they perceive temporally and not eternally.

Farther still, Plato here demonstrates that the one is neither older nor Pivc, Vo l. II. 2 I

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younger than itself, or another. For it was necessary to show that the one is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cause of all things. Hence, since it is the cause of every divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary to show that the one is beyond the order of deified souls. For these souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause; so far as they are essences they originate from being; and so far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one ; receiving their subsistence from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting of certain unities, and of these as elements.

Again, that which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ’ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning. But that which becomes nearer to. its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; for that which approximate* to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning therefore is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different ' from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the same* is in no respect older than younger, but as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and older titan itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itself,'is circularly moved. But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical

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CHAPTER XL.

Having in the preceding chapters presented the reader from the most genuine sources, with all the information that can at present be obtained concerning the mundane Gods, the order of scientific theology requires that those perpetual attendants of the Gods, denominated angels, daemons and heroes, should be in the next place considered. As all these ministrant powers however, are frequently called by one name daemons ; and as Love is denominated by Plato a great daemon, and contains in himself the paradigm of the whole daemoniacal series, it is necessary that the developement of the nature of Love should precede the discussion of the peculiarities of daemons. The following admirable account therefore of this mighty divinity, by Proclus the Coryphaeus of all true philosophers, is extracted firom his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato.

There are different properties of different Gods. For some are the fabricators of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their essential ornament. But others are the suppliers of life, and are the sources of its various genera. Others again preserve the unchangeable order, and guard the indissoluble connexion of things. And others lastly, who are allotted a different power, preserve all things by their beneficent energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cause to all things of conversion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and establishing all secondary natures in the beautiful, replenishing them from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. On this account it is asserted in the Banquet of Plato that Love is a great daemon, because Love first demonstrates in itself a power of this kind, and is the medium between the object of desire and the desiring nature, and is the cause of the conversion of subsequent to prior natures. The whole amatory series therefore, being established in the vestibule of the cause of beauty, calls upwards all things to this cause, and forms a middle progression between the object of Love and the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it

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pre-establishes in itself the paradigm of the whole daerUoniacal order, obtaining the same middle situation among the Gods as daemons between divine and mortal natures. Since therefore, every amatory series possesses this property among the Gods, we must consider its uniform and occult summit as ineffably established in the first orders of the Gods, and conjoined with the first and intelligible beauty; its middle process as shining forth among the supermundane Gods, with an intellectual: condition; its third progression as possessing an exempt power among, the liberated Gods; and its fourth as multifariously distributed about the world, producing, many orders and powers from itself,.and distributing, gifts of this kind to the different parts of the world.

But after the unific and first principle of Love, and after the tripartiteessence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves shines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are filled with Love > and the herds of daemons full, of this God attend on the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the army of heroes, together with daemons and angels, are agitated about the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. Lastly, all. things are excited,, revive and flourish through the influx of the beautiful. But the souls of such men as receive an inspiration of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, assiduously move about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpose of benefiting more imperfect souls, and providing for those natures which require to be saved. The Gods indeed,, and the attendants on the Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, and convert them to themselves; but the souls of men. . descending, and touching on the coasts of generation, imitate the benefit cent providence of the Gods. As, therefore, souls established according, to some other God descend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit souls that revolve in it and some indeed benefit more' imperfect souls by prophecy, others by mystic ceremonies, and others by divine medicinal skill;—thus also souls that chuse an amatory life, are moved about the deity who presides over beautiful natures, for the purpose of taking care of well-born souls. But from apparent beauty they arc led back to divine beauty, and together with themselves elevate those

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who are the objects of their love- And this also divine Love primarily effects in intelligibles. For he unites himself to the object of love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inserts in all things one bond, and one indissoluble friendship with each other, and with the beautiful itself. Souls therefore possessed with Love, and participating the inspiration thence derived, in consequence of using an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and make this the end of their energy. Likewise enkindling a light in more imperfect souls, they also lead these back to a divine nature, and are divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect beauty.

But such souls as from a perverse education fall from the gift which » thence derived, yet are allotted an amatory nature, these, through theii ignorance of true beauty, are busily employed about that which is material and divisible, at which also they are astonished in consequence of not knowing the passion which they suffer. Hence, they abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the darkness of matter. They appear indeed to hasten to a union, with the beautiful, ht the same manner as perfectly amatory souls; but they are ignorant of the union, and tend to a dissipated condition of life, and to matter, which Plato calls the sea of dissimilitude. They are also conjoined with the base itself, and material privation of form. For where are material natures able to pervade through each other ? Or where is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, and replete with the deformity of its subject ? Some souls therefore genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others these gifts are perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wisdom sophistry, so likewise the illumination of Love when it meets with a depraved recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life.

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In another part, likewise, of the same admirable Commentary, Proclus presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions concerning Love; and these are as follow:

Love is neither to be placed in the first, nor among the last of beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love. It is requisite, therefore, that love should be established between the object of Love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the beautiful, but prior to evety nature endued with love. Where then does it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and with what monads does it leap forth?

There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and occult Gods. And the first, indeed, is characterized by the good, understanding the good itself, and residing in that place where according to the oracle the paternal monad abides. But the second is characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes. And the third by the beautiful, where, as Tknteus says, the most beautiful of intelligibles abides. There are, however, three monads according to these intelligible causes, subsisting uniformly and causally in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves: into light in the ineffable order of the Gods, * I mean Faith, Truth, and Love. And Faith indeed establishes all things in good; but Truth : unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly. Love converts all things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This triad* indeed, thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, and imparts to all things, by its light, a union with intelligible itself. It also unfdlds itself differently in different orders, every where combining its powers with the peculiarities of the Gods. And among some jt subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically; but among others, as the cause of

* i. (C. In the summit of that order which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

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connecting and binding; and among others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again, it subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner entirely motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating; there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, there* fore, supernally descends from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards, to divine beauty.. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all things with knowledge. And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe, establishing all things unically in good. Hence the Chaldaean oracles assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, db not require the amatory medium, on account of their inefiable union. But where there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to itself ; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating and perfecting cause of imperfect natures.

The Chaldaean oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates us with the governments of daemons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls Love a great daemon, because it every where fills up the medium between desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in the third order from the beloved object. . Lastly, Love usurps a middle situation between each, congregating and collecting together that which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites intelligi* ble intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks [Orpheus}, calls this. Love, blind; for he says.

In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Lenre *

' woifmuttw npeanStvav) eanp^urw axuv tpanat

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But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account the Cbialdtean oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and daemons with Gods; but it conjoins us both with Gods and daemons. Tn the Gods indeed it has a primary subsistence; in daemons a secondary one; and in partial souls a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods is superessential. But in daemons it subsists according to essence; and in souls according to illuminationw And this triple order appears similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as imparticipahie, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect Thnseus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its nature. But daemoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect ; for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that wc consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence. And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to cause. It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great daemon, was himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly, therefore, does Diotima call it a great daemon. And Socrates conjoins the discourse about Love with that concerning daemons. For as every thing daetnoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise the discourse concerning a daemo'niacal

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nature is conjoined with that concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the object of Love and the lover ; and a daemon is a medium between man and divinity.

CHAPTER XLII.

The nature of daemons, therefore, remains in the next place to be more fully disclosed; for the reader has been already presented with some very important information concerning them, in the discussion of the sublunary Gods. As there is no vacuum then in corporeal, so neither in incorporeal natures. Hence, between divine essences which are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according to a two-fold division, consists of daemons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. Hence, whatever is ineffable and occult in the Gods, daemons and heroes express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in common with the subjects of their providential energies. And these characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power and euergy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls are, a declination to raul-JProc. Vol. II. • 2 K

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titude and motion, a conjunction with the Gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itself, and through itself. And these characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we shall find that those of daemons are to contain in themselves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the Gods, but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize and absorb as it were by their powerful light, whatever daemons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence, they are multiplied indeed but unitedly; mingled, but yet so that the unmingled predominates; and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of superior natures, yet so as never to induce a cessation of energy about, or oblivion of, divinity. In short, daemons and heroes are composed of the properties of the two extremes—Gods and partial souls; but in daemons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.

Having premised thus much, 1 shall next present the reader with all the information I have been able to collect from the most genuine Platonists, and especially from Proclus, on the nature of this middle order of beings. In the first place, therefore, what follows on this subject is derived from the MS. Commentary of Proclus On the First Alcibiades, in which extract also the nature of the daemon of Socrates is unfolded, about which modern wit has been so much puzzled, and so egregiously mistaken.

Let us now speak first, concerning daemons in general; secondly, concerning those that are allotted us in common; and thirdly, concerning the daemon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to science. Daemons, therefore, deriving their first subsistence

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from the vivific Goddess [Juno], and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is more intellectual, and more perfect according to hyparxis; in those of a middle order it is more rational; and in those which rank in the third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the daemoniacal order, it is various, more irrational, and more material. Possessing, therefore, an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction with the Gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence, they are in one way subservient to the liberated Gods, who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane Gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there is one division of daemons according to the twelve supercelestial Gods, and another according to all the peculiarities of the mundane Gods. For every mundane God is the leader of a certain daemoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic God, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities, there is an innumerable multitude of daemons, and which are dignified with the same appellations as their leading Gods. Hence, they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expressing the peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plaints are fabricated, bearing the images of different Gods; daemons proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. But the Gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over daemons; and through this last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of things that are last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle genera, too, of daemons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the Gods, but participated by mortal natures. He, therefore, will not err who asserts that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of the universe in daemons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, viz. that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing supernal

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streams, elevating all secondary natures to the Gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium.

Hence, we must not assent to their doctrine, who say that daemons are the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not proper to consider a daemoniacal nature according to habitude, as the same with a nature essentially daemoniacal; nor to assert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant with multiform mutations. Fora daemoniacal guard subsists always the same, connecting the mundane wholes. But soul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who make certain of the Gods to be daemons, such as the erratic Gods, fi. e. the planets] according to Amelius. But we are persuaded by Plato, who calls the Gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the herds of daemons. And we shall every where preserve the doctrine of Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a daemoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception respecting the whole of the daemoniacal order in common.

CHAPTER XLIII.

In the next place, let us speak concerning the daemons, who are allotted the superintendence of mankind. For of these daemons, which, as we have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine daemons, and who often appear as Gods, through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. Thus, the first intellect is a God, and the most ancient of souls is intellectual. Hence, the highest genus of daemons, as being proximate to the Gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those daemons who participate of an intel-

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lectual peculiarity, and preside over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the Gods. The third are those who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, and complete the bond of those that receive effluxions from thence. The fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through this medium ? For it is this ultimate nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it contains.

Daemons, therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father to their leading Gods. For every God, as we have said, is the leader in the first place of daemons, and in the next of partial souls. For the demiurgus disseminated these, as Timaeus says, into the sun and moon, and the other instruments of time. These divine daemons, therefore, are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders. And every soul, though it revolves together with its leading deity, requires a daemon of this kind. But daemons of the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding God, so they live according to a divine daemon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence, the Egyptian priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine daemon. To souls, therefore, who live as those that will shortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the daemon which attends them here. But to imperfect

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souls the essential is different from the daemon that attends them at their birth.

If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those who make our rational soul a daemon. For a daemon is different from man, as Diotima says, who places daemons between Gods and men, and as Socrates also evinces, when he divides a daemoniacal oppositely to the human nature. “ For,” says he, “ not a human but a daemoniacal obstacle detains me.” But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A daemon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.

This also is evident from Plato in the Timaeus, where he says that intellect has in us the relation of a daemon. But this is only true as far as pertains to analogy. For a daemon according to essence is different from a daemon according to analogy. For in many instances, that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a daemon with respect to that which is inferior, is called a daemon. Thus Jupiter in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious daemon; and Plato in theTimaeus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute the realms of generation, daemons. ** For,” says he, “ to speak concerning other daemons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature.” But a daemon according to analogy is that which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God, or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods: And the soul that through similitude to the daemoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and which suspends the whole of its life from daemons, is a daemon Kara <r^«<r<v, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those daemons, who have lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential daemon is neither called a daemon through habitude to secondary natures, nor through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In short, the rational soul is called in the Timaeus the daemon

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of the animal ; but we investigate the daemon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of the animal, as Socrates says in the Phaedo. For when the animal is no more, the daemon which the soul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that daemon while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after death, this daemon must be the daemon of the man, and not of the animal alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the whole of our composition.

Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a daemon is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those who live according to reason, reason is the daemon; in those that live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live according to desire, the epithymetic or desiring part. Nor must it be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which energizes in our life, is a daemon: as for instance, that reason is the daemon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to desire. For, in the first place, to assert that daemons are parts of our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after Gods and daemons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that daemons, who are of a sublimer order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things essentially more excellent give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also introduce multiform mutations of daemons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life. The daemon, therefore, will vary according to these changes; for the energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, either this energizing part itself is a daemon, or that part which has an arrange-

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ment prior to it, daemons will be changed together with the mutation of human life, and the same person will have many daemons in one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul never changes in one life the government of its daemon; but it is the same daemon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phaedo.

Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with the daemon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual peculiarity with the daemoniacal essence. For all daemons subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine souls. But the intellectual order is differeift from that of soul, and is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.

Further still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding care of a daemoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the daemon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those Gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the daemon that supplies and measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body we require the aid of a daemon. Hence, Plato in the Phaedrus calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he every where calls a daemon the inspector and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a daemon. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoetie part. And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the daemon alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees

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of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And thus much concerning our allotted daemons.

CHAPTER XLIV.

In the next place, with respect to the daemop of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a daemon, but also as a God. For in the First Alcibiades Socrates clearly says, “ 1 have long been of opinion that the God did not as yet direct me to hold any conversation with you/' He calls the same power therefore a daemon and a God. And in the Apology he more clearly evinces that this daemon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered as ranking in a ' daemoniacal order. And this is what we before spid, that the daemons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and elevating life, are divine, transcending the whole of a daemoniacal genus, and being the first participants of the Gods. For, as is a daemon among Gods, such also is a God among daemons. Among the divinities however the hyparxis is divine; but in daemons on the contrary, the peculiarity of their essence is daemoniacal, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account of their transcendency with respect to other daemons they frequently appear as Gods. With great propriety therefore, does Socrates call his daemon a God ; for he belonged to the first and highest daemons. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the daemon of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his daemon. For this is asserted by him in the Theaetetus and in the Proc. Voi.. II. 2 L

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Pheedrus. This voice also is the signal from the daemon, which he speaks of in the Theages. And again in the Phaedrus, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the daemon. What then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice through which he says the daemon signified to him his will ?

In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoetic power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his daemon, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of his daemon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoetic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the daemon suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by the daemon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the daemoniacal inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the illuminations of good daemons and the Gods.

In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the daemon of Socrates; for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a property common to our allotted, daemons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the daemon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good daemon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone

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restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting daemon. For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a daemoniacal discrimination ; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.

But farther still, it may be said, that of daemons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power; others a perfective; and others a demiurgic power. And in short, they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the Gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears therefore, that the daemon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures. And hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For, what else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed, it appears to me, that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titannic multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the daemon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, and restrained his association with the multitude. For the daemon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus; for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity.

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CHAPTER XLV.

From the MS. Scholia also of Prod us on the Cratylus, we derive the following important information concerning this order of beings who connect the divine and human nature together. Of the genera posterior to the Gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce, in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the last of things,—of these genera, some unfold generation into light; others are transporters of union ; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the Gods, and an intellectual essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are skilful in divine concerns, in consequence of being established according to the hyparxis itself of the Gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. Hence, the angelic tribe is boniform , as unfolding into light the occult goodness of the Gods. Others among these are called by theologists daemoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of things. For Sanrai is ro^nrat. But this genus possesses abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last daemons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most partial and material form of energy. Others again, are denominated by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, and transcendency of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a convertive order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which they also convert secondary natures. Hence, they are allotted this appellation, as being able to raise and extend souls to the Gods. (wf otigfiv xat Hvartmiv rag -J/v%ag rri 6tov$ Bvmfieya)

These triple genera posterior to, are indeed, always suspended from the Gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; and

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others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives, i. e. in lives characterised by imagination. It is also evident that such of them as are intellectual, are allotted a prudence or wisdom transcending that of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects of their intellection. But such of them as are rational, energize discursively according to prudence.' And the irrational kind are destitute of prudence. For they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts of the universe. They also bind souls to image-producing bosoms, ( xeu iruvSii rag ipu%ag roig iiSmXorowif xoXroif) and strangle such as are brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which is their due. These three genera therefore, which are more excellent than us, Socrates now calls daemons. And thus much concerning these triple genera, according to Proclus.

Again, with respect to daemons properly so called, there are threA species of them according to the Platonic theology ; the first of which is rational only, and the last is irrational only; but the middle species is partly rational and partly irrational. And again, of these the first is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two species are malevolent and noxious to mankind: not indeed essentially malevolent (for there is nothing in the universe, the ample abode of all-bountiful Jove, essentially evil), but only so from the office which they are destined to perform. For nothing which operates naturally, operates as to itself evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas in his MS. Commentary on tho Phaedrus, and on that part of it in which Plato says, “ There are indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain daemon immediately mingles pleasure with most of them," admirably observes respecting daemons As follows: “The distribution-of good and evil originates from the daernoniacal genus. For every genus transcending that of daemons, uniformly possesses good. There are therefore, certain genera of daemons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of the world; but others certain species of animals. Hence, the daemon who is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition which he himsell is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But there are other daemons transcending these,

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who are the punishers of souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should render propitious. There are other daemons however, more excellent than these, who distribute good in an uniform manner.”

Farther still, Plato in the Phaedo, says, “ that the daemon of each person, which was allotted to him while living, endeavours to lead each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them being collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time.” Olympiodorus in his MS. Commentary on that dialogue, observes on this passage as follows :

“ Since there are in the universe, things which subsist differently at different times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from deity, nor subsists differently at different times according to better and worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper virtue; and is immutable indeed but is not conjoined with the superessential. The whole of this genus is daemoniacal. There are also different genera of dsemons ; for they are arranged under the mundane Gods. The highest of these subsists according to the one of the Gods, which is called an unific and divine genus of daemons. The next according to the intellect which is suspended from Deity, and is called intellectual. The third subsists according to soul, and is called rational. The fourth according to nature, and is denominated physical. The fifth according to body, and is called corporeal-formed. And the sixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after another manner it may be said, that some of these are celestial, others ethereal, others aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others subterranean. With respect also to this division, it is evident that it is derived from the parts of the

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Universe. But irrational daemons originate from the aerial governors, whence also the [Chaldean J Oracle says,

qfgiaw tAanjga xvvaov yimwv rt xcu uygoov.

i. e. “ being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial and aquatic dogs." Our guardian daemons, however, belong to that order of daemons, which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and descent of souls.”

Olympiodorus further observes, “ that the daemon endeavours tQ lead the soul as exciting its conceptions and imaginations, at the same time, however, yielding to the self-motive power of the soul. But in consequence of the daemon exciting, one soul follows voluntarily, another violently, and another according to a mode subsisting between these. There is also one daemon who leads the soul to its judges from the present life; another who is ministrant to the judges, giving completion, as it were, to the sentence which is passed ; and a third who is allotted the guardianship of life.’*

In the next place, with respect to irrational daemons, it remains to investigate how they subsist. For if they derive their subsistence from the junior Gods, how, since these are the fathers of mortal natures, are these daemons immortal ? But if from the demiurgus how are they irrational? For he is the father of things in conjunction with intellect. This doubt is beautifully solved by Proclus as follows: irrational daemons derive their subsistence from the junior Gods, yet are not on this account mortal, since of these Gods some generate others. And perhaps the generated Gods are called by Plato, in the Timaeus, daemons, because those that are truly daemons are produced by the junior Gods. But they likewise proceed from the one demiurgus. For as Timaeus says, he is the cause of all immortal natures. If, however, the demiurgus imparts intellect to all things, there is also in irrational daemons an ultimate vestige of the intellectual peculiarity, so far as they have a facility of imagination ; for this is the last echo as it were of intellect. And on this account the phantasy is not improperly called by others passive intellect. *•

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Lastly, after essential heroes, an order of souls follows, who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are daemoniacal according to habitude or alliance, but not essentially. These souls likewise are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, but they have not an essence wholly superior to man. Of this kind, as we are informed by Proclus in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus, are the Nymphs that sympathize with waters, Pans with the feet of goats and the like. They also differ from those powers that are essentially of a dsemoniacal characteristic in this, that they assume a variety of shapes (each of the others immutably preserving one form) are subject to various passions, and are the causes of every kind of deception to mankind. Proclus likewise observes, that the Minerva which so often appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus belonged to this order of souls.

CHAPTER XLVI.

After the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, those human souls follow that are of an heroic characteristic, are undefiled, associating with generation, and abandoning their proper order but for a little time. For the souls that descend and are defiled with vice, are very remote from those that abide on high with immaculate purity. The media, therefore, between these, are the souls that descend indeed, but without defilement; since it is not lawful for the contrary to take place, viz. to be defiled with vice, and yet to abide on high. For evil is not in the Gods, but in the regions of mortality, and material affairs. The first genus of souls, therefore, is divine. For every where, that which is the recipient of deity has a ruling and leading order, in essences, in intellects, in souls and in bodies. Rut the second genus of souls is always conjoined to the Gods, in order that through this those that some-

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times depart from, may again be recalled to them. The third genus is that which descends indeed into generation, but descends with purity, exchanges a more divine life for one of a subordinate nature, but is exempt from vice, and liberated from the dominion of the passions. For this genus exists in continuity with that which always abides on high, and is always undefiled. And the fourth and last genus is that of the souls of the bulk of mankind, which wanders abundantly, descends as far as to Tartarus, and is again excited from thence. It likewise evolves all-various forms of life, uses a variety of manners, is under the influence of different passions at different times, and assumes the forms of daemons, men, and irrational animals. At the same time, however, it is corrected and amended by Justice, recurs from earth to heaven, and is led round from matter to intellect, but according to certain orderly periods of wholes.

Plotinus beautifully alludes to this undefiled genus of human souls in the 9th book of his 5th Ennead, On Intellect, Ideas, and Being, as follows: “ Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no farther pass through life, considering these as the first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant is good ; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those too, among them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford them rest, they betake themselves together with the name of virtue to actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. In the third class is the race of divine men , who through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely Proc. Vol. II. 2 M

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perceive supernal tight, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness as it were of this lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.”

These undefiled souls are called by the author of the Golden Verses, « terrestrial daemons,” because, as Hierocles observes, they are by nature men, but by habitude dpemons, and possess a scientific knowledge of divinity. For since all men are terrestrial, as ranking in the third degree of rational beings, but all are not skilful (imtuwmv) and wise, the author of the verses very properly calls wise men hoth terrestrial and daemons conjointly. For neither are all men wise, nor are all the beings that are wise, men. But the illustrious heroes 1 and the immortal Gods, being naturally more excellent than men, are wise and good. The verses therefore exhort us to reverence those men who are co-arranged with the divine genera, and who (according to habitude) are equal to angels and daemons, and are similar to the illustrious heroes,

Plato, in the Cratylus, calls these undefiled souls both daemons and heroes, and speaks of them as follows ; “ Soc. Do you not know who those daemons are which Hesiod speaks of? Herm. I do not. Soq, And are you ignorant that he says the golden race of men was first generated ? Herm, This I know. Soc. He says, therefore, that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced daemons denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men. Herm. But what then? Soq. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally consisting of gold, but as being beautiful and good. 1 infer this, however, from his denominating our race an iron one. Herm. You speak the truth. Soc. Do you not therefore think, that if any one of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he belonged to the golden race? Herm. It is probable he would. Soc. But are the good any other than such as are [intellectually] prudent ? Herm. They

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' The author of these verses comprehends the triple genera that are more excellent than man, viz. angels, daemons and heroes, under the appellation o£ illustrious heroes.

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are not. Soc. On this account, therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them daemons, because they Were prudent and learned (iSay/MPis). And in our ancient tongue this very name is to be found. Hence both he and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, Whert they say that a good man after death wi41 receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a dam on, according to the surname of prudence. 1 therefore assert the same, that every good man is learned and skilful; that he is demoniacal both while living and when dead ; and that he is properly denominated a daemon. Herm. And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name hero signify ? Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand. For this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love. Herm. How is this? Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods ? Herm. What then ? Soc. All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a God towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a Goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to die ancient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation. For it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name/'

The meaning of Plato in this passage, and also the characteristic properties of terrestrial heroes are beautifully unfolded by Proclus as follows, in his very rare and invaluable MS. Scholia on the Cratylus. “ Every where the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus for instance, our master Hermes (« tiunrotiif ijftwy Bg/xtjf) being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a God. But Plato calls the whole extent between Gods and men daemons. And they indeed, are daemons by nature. Those daemons, however, that are now mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not daemons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the Gods; but they are only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, deration and magnificence.

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Such heroes also it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest in the Laws. This heroic genus of souls, therefore, does not always follow the Gods, but is undefiled, and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls, are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

Each of the Gods indeed is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, and the first and more total of daemons are likewise established above a habitude of this kind. They employ, however, terrestrial and partial spirits in the generations of some of the human race, not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expand* ing the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables, therefore, through the similitude of appellation conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the Gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that Gods have connexion with women, or men with Goddesses. But if they were willing to speak .plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; such as' the angelical, daemoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers, therefore, of these orders, have much communion with the human race; for the extremities of first are connascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account it is frequently seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. Not only a daemoniacal genus, however, of this kind, physically

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sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags, or serpents.

But how is it that at one time the Gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the Gods ? We reply, that the communion of Gods with Goddesses gives subsistence to Gods or daemons eternally; but heroic souls having a two-fold form of life, viz. doxastic and diandetic , the former of which is called by Plato in the Timaeus the circle of difference t and the latter, the circle of sameness , and which are characterized by the properties of male and female ;— hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or the circle of sameness , and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or the circle of difference ; yet so as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind.

• But the -souls which act erroneously according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical, nor of intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect from gregarious souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all-various fractions and distortions.

As it is impossible therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called demigods , as having only one of their circles illuminated by the Gods. Such of these therefore, as have the circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to. an intellectual life, and are moved about it according to a

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deific energy,—these are said to have a God for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time enthusiastically, or in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity,—these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a Goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause.' Hence when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs,* and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely* inspired energy, as being the son of a Goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even when in Hades, he desires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required.

In the last place Proclus adds, that heroes are very properly denpminated from Love, since Love is a great daemon: and from the co-operation of daemons heroes are produced. To which may also be added, that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are analogously produced from different genera.”

Plato who was one of these heroes or demigods, was the offspring of Apollo in the way above explained by Proclus, as we are informed by Olympiodorus in his life of him. For he says, “It is reported that an

1 It must however, be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner^ without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

1 See a most masterly defence of the character of Achilles as a hero in my translation of Proclus’s noble apology for Homer, in the first Volume of my Plato.

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Apolloniacal spectre had connection with Perictione the mother of Plato, and that appearing in the night to Aristo the father of Plato, it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her pregnancy—which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like account of the divine origin of Plato is also given by Apuleius in his treatise on the dogmas of Plato, and by Plutarch in the 8th book of his Symposiacs. Epimenides likewise, Eudoxus and Xenocrates asserted that Apollo becoming connected with Parthenis the mother of Pythagoras, and causing her to be pregnant, had in consequence of this predicted concerning Pythagoras by his priest.' And thus much concerning those undefiled souls who were called by the ancients terrestrial daemons, heroes and demigods, and who descended into the regions of mortality for the benevolent purpose of benefiting those apostate souls, who are elegantly called by Empedocles,

Heaven's exiles straying from the orb of light

CHAPTER XLVII.

The triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, and which have been unfolded in the preceding chapters, are indicated by the following division of time, in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides; from which division the one is shown to be exempt: “ Do not the terms it was, it has "been , it did become , seem to signify the participation of the time past ? Certainly. And do not the terms it will be, it may become, and it will be generated, signify that which is about to be hereafter ? Certainly. But are not the terms it is, and it is becoming to be, marks of the present time ? Entirely so. If then the one participates in no respect

1 Vid. Iamblich. de vita Fythsg. Cap. 2.

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of any time, it neither ever was, nor has been, nor did become. Nor is it now generated, nor is becoming to be, nor is, nor may become hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be. It is most true.”

The commentary of Proclus on this passage is as follows: “ This division of time accords with the multitude of the divine genera, which are suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, daemons, and heroes. And in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally, according to a triadic distribution into the present, past, and future; and in the next place, according to a distribution into nine, each of these three being again subdivided into three. For the monad of souls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of this multitude, those participate of this whole totally, that subsist according to the past, or the present , or the future ; but those participate of it partially, that are essentialized according to the differences of these. For to each of the wholes a multitude is co-ordinated, divided into things first, middle, and last. For a certain multitude subsists in conjunction with that which is established conformably to the past, the summit of which is according to the was, but the middle according to it has been, and the end according to it did become. With that also which is established according to the present, there is another multitude, the principal part of which is characterized by the is, the middle by it is generated, and the end by it is becoming to be. And there is another triad with that which subsists according to the future, the most elevated part of which is characterized by the will be, that which ranks in the middle by it may become, and the end by it will be generated. And thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these three totalities, but all these are suspended from their monad.

All these orders, likewise, which are distributed according to the parts of time, energize according to the whole of time; this whole containing in itself triple powers, one of which is perfective of all motion, the second connects and guards things which are governed by it, and the third unfolds divine natures into light. For, as all such things as are not eternal, are led round in a circle, the wholeness or the monad of time, perfects and connects their essence, and discloses to them the united infinity of eter-

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nity, evolving the contracted multitude which subsists in eternal natures; whence also this apparent time, as Timaeus says, unfolds to us the measures of divine periods, perfects sensibles, and guards things which are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, possesses triple powers prior to souls, viz. the perfective , the connective, and the unfolding, according to a similitude to eternity. For eternity, possessing a middle order in intelligibles, perfects the order posterior to itself, supplying it with union, but unfolds into light that which is prior to itself, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and connects the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intransitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving supernally the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to souls. Eternity, however, possesses this triad unitedly; but time both unitedly and distributively; and souls distributively alone. ' Hence, of souls, some are characterized according to one, and others according to another power of time; some imitating its unfolding , others its perfective, and others its connective power. Thus also with respect to the Fates, some of these being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are said to sing the past, always indeed energizing, and always singing, their songs being intellections, and fabricative energies about the world : for the past is the source of completion. Others again of these are adapted to connect things present ; for they guard the essence and the generation of these. And others are adapted to unfold the future ; for they lead into essence and to an end that which as yet is not.

We may also say, since there is an order of souls more excellent than ours divided into such as are first, such as are middle, and such as are last, the most total of these are adapted to the past. For as this comprehends in itself the present and the future, so these souls comprehend in themselves the rest. But souls of a middle rank are adapted to the present; for this was one e future, but is not yet the past. As, therefore, the present contains in itself the future, so these middle souls comprehend those posterior, but are comprehended in those prior to themselves. And souls of the third order correspond to the future. For this does not proceed through the present, nor has become the past, but is the future alone; just as these third souls are of themselves alone, but through Proc. Vol. II. • 2 N

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fatting into a rare partial subsistence, are by no means comprehensive of others. For they convolve the boundary according to a triadic division of the. genera posterior to the Gods.

The whole of the first triad, therefore, has the once, for this is the peculiarity of the post, and of completion; but it is divided into the was, it was generated , and it did become. Again, therefore, of these three, the was signifies the summit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itself; but it was generated, signifies an at-once-collected perfection; and it did become, an extension in being perfected; these things being imitations of intelligibles. For the was is an imitation of being, it was generated, of eternity, and it did become, of that which is primarily eternal. For being is derived to all things from the first of these; a subsistence at once as alt, and a whole front the second; and an ewtension into multitude from the third.

CHAPTER XL VIII.

Having, therefore, unfolded to the reader the orders and characteristic properties of the mundane Gods, and of the triple genera that are perpetually suspended from them, I shall in the next place present him with what Plato, says, in celebration of the divinity of the World, the great monad which, comprehends all these, so far as the whole of it is a God, consisting; of! a superessential unity derived from the ineffable principle of all things* a divine intellect, a divine soul, and a deified body. In the Timmus then, Plato celebrates the world as a deity in the following manner; “When, therefore* that God who is an eternally reasoning divinity cogitated about the God who at a certain time would exist, he fabricated his body smooth and equable, and every way from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from the composition of perfect bodies. But placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the

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whole; and besides this, externally surrounded the body of the universe with soul. And causing circle to revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i. e. the world) one, only, solitary nature, able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts the world was generated by him, a blessed God. The first part of this extract, as far as to the word “ perfect bodies,” is admirably elucidated by Proclus as follows:

What is here said, imitating the one intellect which comprehends the intellection of wholes in one, collects all things into sameness, and refers to one summit all the fabrication of the corporeal system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recal to our memory what has been already asserted. It has been said then, that the elements through analogy rendered all things in concord with each other. That the universe was generated a whole consisting of wholes. That it is spherical and smooth, and has itself a knowledge of itself, and a motion in itself. Hence, it is evident that the whole world is assimilated to [its paradigm^ all-perfect animal. But the orderly distribution according to the wholes which it contains proceeds analogous to its second and third causes. And the number of its elements indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, corresponds to the essence which is without colour, without figure, and without contact; * for number is there. The first wholeness of the world which adorns all things, and which consists of the wholes of the elements, proceeds analogous to the intellectual wholeness. * Its sphericity is analogous to intellectual figure.* Its sufficiency, intellectual motion, and sameness of convolution, are analogous to the God who absorbs all his offspring in himself. 4 Its animation corresponds to its vivific cause ^Rhea]- And its possession of intellect is analogous to the demiurgic intellect; though from this all things proceed, and from the

' And thit essence^ as is shown in the 4th book, subsists at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.

* This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order.

* This forms the extremity of that order.

* Viz. to Saturn, who subsists at the summit of the intellectual order.

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natures prior to it, different things being analogous to different causes. And the more excellent natures indeed are the causes of all that proceeds from secondary principles; but secondary principles are the causes of less numerous and less excellent effects. For with respect to the demiurgus himself, so far as he is intellectual, he produces all things intellectual; but so far as he is being, he is the father of all bodies and of every thing incorporeal; and so far as he is a God, he also gives subsistence to matter itself. In what is now said, therefore, Plato makes a summary repetition of every thing which the universe derives from the intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory.

Let us survey, however, more particularly the truth of what is now said. When, therefore, Plato calls the demiurgus, “ an eternally reasoning being," he makes the essence and at the same time the intellection of him through which the world is perpetual, to be eternal. It is requisite, likewise, to observe how he arranges the demiurgus among beings that always exist, assigning to him an eternal order; so that he will not be soul. For in the Laws Plato says that soul is immortal indeed, and indestructible, but is not eternal. Hence, it appears that every one who fancies soul is the demiurgus, is ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the indestructible. But reasoning is significant of distributed or divided fabrication. And the words, “ who at a certain time would exist,” do not indicate a temporal beginning, as Atticus imagined they did, but an essence conjoined with time. For Plato says in this dialogue, “ that time was generated together with the universe,” and the world is temporal, and time is mundane. For tipie and the world are consubsistent with each other, and co-produced from the one fabrication of things. And a temporal ever , may be said to be at a certain time , when compared with that which is eternal, just as that which is generatively being , is non-being, when compared with that which is intelligibly being. Though the world, therefore, exists through the whole of lime, yet its being consists in becoming to be, and is in a part of time. But this is the aw« or the at a certain time, mentioned by Plato, and is not a simultaneous subsistence in all time, but is always at a certain time. For the eternal is always in the whole of eternity; but the temporal in a certain time, is. always differently

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in a different time. Hence, the world, as with reference to an eternally existing God, is very properly called a God, who at a certain time would exist. For the former is sensible with reference to the latter, who is intellectual. That which is sensible, therefore, is always generated , but is at a certain time. For it possesses existence partibly, and is perpetually advancing into being from that which always is. For since, as we have before observed, it derives from something else an infinite power of existing, and that which it possesses is finite, but it is perpetual by always receiving, the ability of existing infinitely, being numbered in that which is finite, it is evident that it is at a certain time; from a certain time always possessing existence; and in consequence of that which is imparted to it never ceasing, always becoming to be; ‘ but in its own nature existing at a certain time, and having, as Plato says in the Politicos, a renovated immortality. For subsisting in rising into existence, the whole of it does not at once participate of the whole of being, but again and again, not existing without an extension of being. Unless, perhaps, the expression at a certain time , signifies the whole of time. For the evolution of time, as with reference to an eternal infinity is tot* a certain time. And the , whole of time has the same ratio to eternity, that a part of time the tot* has to the whole.

If, also, you are willing, it may be said after another manner, that Plato denominates the world “ a God that at a certain time would exist,*’ since he has now fashioned a corporeal nature, and given.subsistence to intellect, but not yet to soul, because the world also as a God will have a subsistence in the course of his narration. For divinity produces at once both parts and the whole, but language divides things that are consubsistent, generates things that are unbegotten, and distributes eternal natures according to time. The God, therefore, that at a certain time would exist, is that which is fashioned in the narration of Plato, and according to which there are division and composition. For this, also, the Pythagoric Timaeus himself indicates to those who are able to under-

1 Instead of xai ha to fir) X *yew, to out ywofievos, it is necessary to read ha to w Ai jyuv to

hlov, mi yivoiwvo$.

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stand him, when he says in his treatise [On the soul of the world], “ Before heaven (i. e. the world) was generated in words, there were idea and matter, and God the demiurgus.” For he clearly manifests that he fashions in words the generation of the world.

When Plato, likewise, says that the demiurgus fabricated the body of the world smooth and equable, this manifests the one comprehension in the world, and its supreme aptitude to the participation of a divine soul. But the words, “ every way from the middle equal,” exhibit the peculiarity of a spherical figure; for this is every way equally distant according to all intervals. And the words “ whole and perfect from the composition of perfect bodies," give to the world a consummate similitude to all-perfect animal; for that was in all things perfect; and also to the demiurgus himself. For as he is the father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, so the world is the most perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may also say, that Plato calls the world smooth, as not being in want of any motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs; for this had just before been demonstrated by him. But that it is every way equal from the middle, as having a spherical figure. And that it is whole and perfect, as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing external to itself; for this is properly a whole and perfect. It likewise consists of perfect bodies, as- being composed of the four elements. But Plato calls it in the singular number a body, as being only-begotten. And thus beginning from the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to perfection, he again returns to it through the above-mentioned words, imitating the progression of the world from its paradigm, and its perfect conversion to it.

CHAPTER XLIX.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the words, “ But placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the

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whole; and besides this, externally sarrounded the body of the universe with soul." Divinity, says Proclus, at once and eternally prodaces all things. For according to his very being, and according to the eternal intellection of wholes, he generates all things from himself, supermundane and mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies, and matter itself. And indeed, an at-once-collected subsistence in a greater degree belongs to the demiurgic progeny, than to the solar illumination; though in this the whole light proceeds simultaneously with the sun. But it is evident that the sun imitating the father of the universe through visible fabrication is inferior to eternal and invisible production. All things, therefore, as we hare said, being produced from the invisible fabrication at once and eternally, at the same time, the order of the effects is likewise preserved. For all things proceed collectively together with their own proper order. For in the producing cause, there was also an eternal inteHectiow, and order prior to the things that were arranged. Hence, though all things proceed at once from one cause, yet some have a first , and others a diminished dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, but others in a less degree. And some are co-arranged with the demiurgus according to union, others according to contact, and others according to participation. For intellect is able to be connascent with' intellect through union; but soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with intellect; and bodies participate of it only, just as things in the profundity of the earth participate of the splendour of the sun. All these, therefore, subsisting in the world, viz. intellect, soul, and body, and all these being produced at once, and at the same time, there being an ordfer in these proceeding from the demiutgus, language at one time beginning supernally according to progression, ends at the boundaries of fabrication, but at another time being incited * from things last, according to conversion, recurs to the summits of the universe, conformably to things themselves. For all things proceed, and are converted to the cause and principle from which they proceeded; in so doing exhibiting a certain demiurgic circle.

* For epm/uvos here, it is necessary to read

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Plato, however, delivered to us the order of the plenitudes {^Mp <0 H MTa>y )' of the world, according to progression, in what he before said, when the demiurgus placing intellect in soul, and soul in body fabricated 1 the universe, but in the present passage, he unfolds to us the order according to conversion. And in the first place, he assumes two contraries in the universe, adds two media to these, and unites them through analogy. Afterwards giving completion to the world, by rendering it a whole of wholes, he surrounds it with an intellectual [i. e. with a spherical] figure, gives it the power of participating a divine life, and a motion imitating intellect. * Always, likewise, causing the world to be more perfect by the additions, he introduces soul into it as her proper place of abode, and fills all things with life, but different things with a different life. He also inserts intellect in soul, and through this conjoins her with her fountain. For the soul of the universe participating of intellect, is connected with intelligibles themselves. And thus he ends at the principle from which the mundane intellect, soul and the body of the world proceed. For giving a three-fold division to the universe, viz. into intellect, soul, and body, he discusses in the first place the two latter which are subordinate. For such is the mode according to conversion. And he terminates indeed the discussion of the body of the world, having unfolded its essence, its figure, and its motion. But the theory of soul is connected with this, just as the body itself of the world is suspended from a divine soul.

With respect, however, to the position of soul in the middle of the universe, it is differently explained by the different interpreters of Plato. For some call the centre of the earth the middle, but others the moon, as being the isthmus of generated and divine natures. Others again say that the sun is the middle, as being established in the place of a heart [in the world], others the inerratic sphere, others the equinoctial, as bounding the breadth of the universe, and others the zodiac. And some

1 Wholes whether corporeal or incorporeal are thus denominated.

1 For o-tmxTiivixTo, it is necessary to read rvMTcxnuvtrv.

1 i. e. a circular motion.

«

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indeed place the governing principle in the centre of the universe, others in the moon, others in the sun, others in the equinoctial, and others in the zodiac. And the power of the centre testifies in favour of the first of these, since it is connective of every circulation; the motion of the moon, in favour of the second, since it variously changes generation ; the vivific heat of the sun, in favour of the third; the facility of the motion of the equinoctial circle, of the fourth; and in favour of the fifth, the circulation of the stars about the zodiac. Porphyry, however, and Jamblichus, oppose all these interpretations, and reprobate them as understanding the middle in a way accompanied with interval, and enclosing in a certain part the soul of the whole world, which is every where similarly present, which rules over all things, and leads all things by its own motions. Of these divine men, however, Porphyry assuming the soul to be the soul of the universe, interprets the middle according to the psychical essence; for soul is the middle of intelligibles and sensibles. This interpretation, however, does riot appear to say any thing as with reference to the words of Plato. But if we assume this, that the universe derives its completion from intellect, soul and body, and that it is a psychical and intellectual animal, we shall find in this system that soul is the middle. This, therefore, Plato had before asserted; and now he will appear to say nothing else, than that the soul of the world is extended through the universe, being allotted a middle order in it. But the philosopher Jamblichus thinks that by soul we should understand the exempt, supermundane, and liberated soul, and which has dominion over all things. For according to him, Plato does not here speak of the mundane soul, but of the soul which is not'participated by body, and which is arranged as a monad above all mundane souls. For the first soul is of this kind, and the middle is asserted of this, as being similarly present to all things, because it does not belong to any body, has no manner of habitude whatever, similarly animates all things, and is equally distant from all things. For it is not distant from some things in a less, and from others in a greater degree, •

since it is without habitude; but it is alike distant front all things; though all things are not after the same manner distant from it. For in its participants there is the more and the less.

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Our leader, however, [Syrianus] more aptly interprets Hie words of Plato. For the soul of the world has indeed that which is supermundane and exempt from the universe, according to which it is conjoined with intellect, which Plato in the Phssdrus, and Orpheus in his verses concerning Ippa 1 denominate the head or summit of the soul. It has also another multitude of powers proceeding from this monad, divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of the universe. And these subsist in one way indeed about the middle, in another way about the earth, in another about the sun, and in another about each of the spheres. Our leader, therefore, says that all these are comprehended in the present words of Plato, who indicates by them, that the soul of the world in one way animates the middle, in another the whole bulk, and that it leaves something else prior to these exempt from the universe.

That we may not, however, carelessly attend to what is here said by Plato, but may offer something demonstrative about tbe psychical powers, it must be said, that soul by a much greater priority than body is a vital world, and is both one and number. And by the one indeed, it is better than every form of habitude; but by the multitude it rules over the difc ferent parts of the universe. For in its guardian powers it contaius the centre; since from thence the whole sphere is governed, to which also it converges. Farther still, every thing turbulent in the world is impelled to the middle, and requires a divine guard, which is able to arrange it, and detain it in its proper boundaries. Hence also, theologists terminate the progressions of the highest Gods in that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle either the tower or the prison of Jupiter. But in its stable and at the same time vivific powers, it oontains the sphere of the earth. In its perfective and generative powers, the sphere of water. In its connective and motive powers it comprehends the air. In its undefiled powers, fire. And in Rs intellectual powers, the whole heaven. In these powers, likewise, it in one way contains tbe lunar, in another the solar, and in another the inerratic sphere.

• Proclua elsewhere informs us in these Commentaries, that the soul of the world is called by Orpheus Jppa.

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OF PLATO.

m

Such therefore, being the animation of the world, or itk^participation of soul, Plato, as it is usual with him, beginning according to conversion from things that are last, first imparts soul to the middle, afterwards to the universe, and in the third place leaves something of soul external to the universe. For as be gave subsistence to body prior to soul, and to parts prior to wholes, thus also he imparts soul to the world, beginning from things that have an idti mate existence. When Plato therefore delivered the order of the plenitudes of the world according to progression, beginning supernally, he placed intellect in soul, and soul in body. But here where he delivers the order according to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the universe itself. For the river of vivification proceeds as far as to the centre; as the Chaldaean oracles also assert, when speaking about the middle of the five centres, which ’ from on high passes entirely to the opposite part, through the centre of the earth. For they say: “ And another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends as far as to the material rivers." Hence Plato beginning from those things in which animation ends, Recurs to the whole vivification, and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. We must not therefore place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for this is exempt from the universe; but a certain power of it which guards the whole order of the. world. For nothing else in the universe has so much the power of entirely subverting the whole of things, as the centre and the power of the centre, about which the universe with measured motion harmoniously revolves. Hence it appears to me that Plato divinely says that the demiurgus placed soul and not the soul in the middle of the universe. For these differ from each other, because the latter establishes the whole soul in the centre, but the former a certain power of it, and a different power in different parts.

The philosopher himself however, shortly after, when speaking of the animation itself of the world says, “ But the soul being extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it externally in a circle, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life through the whole of time.” For the words w to be every way extended from the middle,” have the same meaning as •* to

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be extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe.” But in the latter, the soul herself illuminates from herself the centre of the universe and the whole sphere of it by her powers; while in the former, the demiurgus is the cause of the animation, himself introducing the soul into the universe as into her proper place of abode. For the same thing is effected by both, but demiurgically indeed and intellectually; by the cause, and self-motively by soul. Now however, the philosopher delivers the bond which proceeds from fabrication alone. For we particularly refer wholes and such things as are good to a divine cause; but we consider partial natures, and such things- as are not good, to be unworthy of divine fabrication; and we suspend them from other proximate causes, though these also, as it is frequently said, subsist from divinity. Since therefore both a divine and a partial soul have communication with bodies, the former indeed subsisting according to boniform will, and not departing from intelligible progressions is deific; but the latter which takes place through a defluxion of the wings of the soul, or through audacity, or flight, is atheistical, though the former is- complicated with the self-motive energy, and the latter with providential care. But in the one a subsistence according to deity is apparent through the presence of divinity ; and in the other, a subsistence from soul, through, the representation of aberration.

CHAPTER L.

In the next place Timseus, or rather Plato adds, “ And causing circle to revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i. e. the* world) one, only, solitary nature;” on which Proclus observes as follows: The philosopher ' Porphyry weil interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle. For it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to be moved in a

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CHAP. L.

OF PLATO.

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circle, as a stone when whirled round; and also for a circle to be moved not in a circle, as a wheel when rolled along. But it is the peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, through harmoniously revolving about •;the centre. In a still greater degree however, the divine Jamblichus well interprets the meaning of these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being psychical, bnt the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in the former. For this is conformable to what has been before said, and accords with what , is afterwards asserted. For Plato himself shortly after moves the eorporeal nature according to the psychical circle, and renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul.

Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to a triple cause, viz; the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. one , is assumed from the final cause ; for the one is the same with the good. But the second, viz. only, is assumed from the paradigmatic cause. For the only-begotten and onlyness (jMvmtns) were, prior to the universe, in all-perfect animal: And the third, viz. the solitary , is assumed from the demiurgic cause: For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the world, proceeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore is one, so far as it is united, and is converted to the one. But it is only, so far as it participates of the intelligible, and comprehends all things in itself. And it is solitary, so far as it is similar to its father, and is .able to save itself: From the three however, it appears that it is a God. For the one, the perfect , and the self-sufficient, axe the elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a God; being one indeed, according to hyparxis; but alone, according to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; and solitary, through being sufficient to itself. For those that lead a solitary life, being converted to themselves, have the hopes of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term solitary, will be evident from the following words of Plato: “Able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external,, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself.” For in these words, he

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clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who possesses virtue is able to associate with, and love himself with a parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness, is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man perceiving himself beautiful Fejoices and is delighted, and producing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful, but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself, it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.

It is proper therefore to assert these things to those who place intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be blessed ? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself, must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature; since the one cause of the virtues,’ is also ccvarranged with the fountain of souls, 1 and the progression of this fountain is conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to

■ i. c, Vesta. * L«. Juno.

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CHAP. L.

Of PLATO.

295

virtue, one indeed is unite!, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods j and another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself, and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For knowledge precedes familiarity.

Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a Cod, so for indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; but so far as it is a God, it is friendly to itself. For union is more perfect than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is intellectual; for that which is primarily known to itself is intellect. And if it is friendly to itself, it is united. But that which is united is deified; for the one which is in intellect is a God. Again therefore, you have virtue, a knowledge of, and a friendship with itself, in the world; the first of these proceeding^ into it from soul; the second from intellect; and the third from deity. Hence Plato very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was generated by the demiurgus a blessed God ; for the presence of soul, the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the universe a God. And the blessed God which he now mentions is the God “whoat a certain time would exist," animated,endued with intellect, and united. Union however is present with it according to the bond of analogy ; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it participates. For through these, greater bonds ; and a more excellent union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions* divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the whole world. For the bond which proceeds from intellect and soul is strong, as Orpheus also says; but the union of the golden chain [i. e. of the deific series] is still greater, and is the cause of greater good to all things.

Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the universe. For since it is suspended from the paternal intellect and the whole fabrication of things, and since it lives conformably to these causes, it is consequently happy (««8a»fu»») ’ from them. For the demiurgus also

* i. e. Having a good daemon.

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>8 denominated a daemon by Plato in the Pohticus, and a great daemon by Orpheus when he says,

.One the great daemon and the loxd of alL*

He therefore who lives according to the will of the father, and preserves the intellectual nature which was imparted to him from thence immutable is happy, and blessed. The first, and the all-perfect form of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phaedrus calls happy Gods, following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [viz. the felicity of angels, daemons and heroes]. For there is one virtue of angels, another of daemons, and another of the heroic genera: and the form of felicity is triple being different according to each genus. The fourth form of felicity is that which subsists in the undefiled souls, who make blameless descents {[into the realms of generation,] and exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial souls [such as ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an attendant on the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different, so likewise perfection is defined by different measures. And the last form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals. For every thing which obtains a perfection adapted to it according to nature, is happy. _ For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined to its proper daemon, and partakes of his providential care. The forms of felicity therefore, being so many, the first and highest must be placed in the world, and which also is now mentioned by Plato. We must not however wonder that he immediately calls the world a God, from its participation of soul. For every thing is deified through that which is proximately prior to it; the corporeal world indeed through soul; but 6oul through intellect, as the Athenian guest also says; and intellect through the one . Hence, intellect is divine, but. not a God.

’ Instead of n; Sai fiam tyeve to ptyaf ctg^o; uiro xavrwv, It is requisite to read ti( laifim ytvirt fLtyeif etg%os aicurrw.

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CHAP. LI. OF PLATO. 2pj

The one however is no longer a God through any thing else, but is primarily a God; just as intellect is primarily gnostic, as soul is primarily self-motive, and as body is primarily in place.

f

CHAPTER LI.

Ik the last place, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in the Timaeus about the name of the world, and add to it the elucidations of Proclus; for thus every thing pertaining to the mundane Gods, and their great recipient the universe will have been amply, and I trust satisfactorily discussed. Plato therefore says on this subject: “We shall denominate the universe, heaven , or the world, or by any other appellation in which it may especially rejoice." These names, says Proclus, were attended with much ambiguity with the ancients. For some alone called the sublunary region xorpof kotrnos , the world , and the region above it ***** ouranos , heaven ; but others called heaven a part of the world. And some indeed, considered the moon as the boundary of heaven; but others denominated the summits of generation heaven. Thus Homer,

Extended heaven in ether and the cloud*

Fell to the lot of Jove.

Hence Plato very properly prior to the whole theory speaks definitively concerning these names, denominating the universe heaven and the world. And he calls it heaven indeed, as perceiving the things above, contemplating the intelligible, and participating an intellectual essence; but the world, as always being filled and adorned by true beings. He likewise denominates it heaven as being converted to the principles of its existence? but the world as proceeding from them. For it was generated by true beings, and is converted to them. As however, of statues which are Proc. Vol. II. 2 P

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established by the telestic (or mystic) art, some things are apparent' in them, but others are inwardly concealed, which are symbolical * of the presence of the Gods, and are known to the mystic framers of them alone; after the same manner the universe being the statue of the intelligible world, and perfected by the father, has some things apparent which are indications of its divinity, but others unapparent, which are the marks, seals, or impressions of the participation of true being, 5 which it received from the father who gave it perfection ; in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real essence. The appellations also heaven and the world are names significant of the apparent powers in the universe; the latter indeed, so far as they proceed from the intelligible, but the former, so far as they are converted to it.

It is necessary however, to know that the divine name of the abiding power of the universe, and which is a symbol of the demiurgic seal, according to which also it subsists in unproceeding union with real being, is ineffable, and not vocal, and is known to the Gods themselves. For there are appropriate names in every order of things; divine indeed, in the Gods; but dianoetic in the subjects of the discursive power of reason; and doxastic in the objects of opinion. And this also Plato asserts in the Cratylus, assenting to Homer who places one kind of names of the same things in the Gods, and another kind in the opinions of men, as

Gods call it Xanthus, but Scamander men.

And '

Chalcis its name with those of heavenly birth,

But call’d Cymindis by the sons of earth.

And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is of one kind, but that of partial souls of another, so names in the former are different from those in the latter. Divine names however, unfold the whole essence of the things named; but those of

1 For a$«vi) here, it is necessary to read

1 For rm iem iragwnetf, it is requisite to read <ru/t/3oXixa rr,s toiv, x. X.

* After row ©m>j here, it is requisite to supply ovtoj.

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CHAP. LI.

OF PLATO.

299

men only effect this partially. Plato therefore knowing that this preexisted in the world, omits to mention what the divine and ineffable name of it is which is different from the apparent, and with great caution speaks of it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, “or by any other appellation in which it may especially rejoice,” are a latent hymn of the mundane name so far as it is allotted an unspeakable and divine essence, in order that it may be co-ordinate to that which is signified by him. Hence also, divine mundane names are delivered by theurgists ; some being called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some of them being the names of the unapparent powers in the world, but others, of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Plato therefore, here delivers both the apparent and the unapparent name of the world, the former indeed, dyadically, but the latter monadically ; for the words, “ or by any other,” are significant of oneness. And the ineffable name indeed of the universe, is indicative of its abiding in its father; the name world , of its progression ; and heaven , of its regression. But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which it is full of good, abiding indeed ineffably, but proceeding perfectly, and returning to the goody as to the preexisting object of desire.

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Version 1.0.2 — current. This is the version a bare /texts/proclus-theology-of-plato-taylor-1816/ serves. A new version is a new URL; this one is kept, so a citation to it keeps resolving.

A transcription being repaired, not a clean text. What stands here is a transcription of the printed edition below — every character of it kept — with the repairs that have been decided recorded as rules and applied to the reading view. Each repair is a rule with the words it changes, why, and the witness it was decided from; the rules are applied by the view and are never baked into the words served, so the transcription is always beside its repairs and the difference between the two views is the repair list itself. Where the print's word could NOT be determined — from the transcription's own context, from a parallel edition of the same translation, or from another copy of the same print — no repair is invented: the scanner's damage stays, marked, and a rule records the decision to leave it. The work is therefore NOT finished: this edition is readable from end to end, and a reader will still meet garble where nothing could settle the print's word — what was settled is settled and shown, what was not is shown as the transcription has it, and nothing is silently said that the print does not.

The state of this edition: in repair — this text is READABLE BUT STILL GARBLED. The transcription it is built from is a good reading of the 1816 print, not a faithful one, and where nothing could decide what the print actually says, the reading view shows the transcription’s own wrong characters, marked as damage — so a reader will meet passages that read as garble, and this page does not pretend otherwise. The whole text has been read, and the witnesses were the second transcription of the same 1816 print that stands beside this one on the shelf, together with the other copies of that same print held here — their own scans, their own page images, their own reading of the page. Every reading those could settle is recorded as a rule and applied by the reading view: each rule gives the words it changes, why, and the witness it was decided from, and where two copies of the print read the same words at the same line, the rule says that, because two independent readings of the same print agreeing is what makes the reading worth trusting; where the witness was a copy’s own page rather than this edition’s, the rule names that copy and the leaf of it the words stand on. What could not be settled is left standing and named, not hidden: the questions still open keep their reasons — a reading nothing places on the line it was asked about, a page line two answers came back for, a word the page itself will not read — and the reading view shows the transcription’s characters there rather than a guess. The edition is therefore not finished and not clean: what was settled is settled and recorded, what was not is visible, and the work of settling the rest stands open. Measured on the text this page serves: 3271 repair rules, applied 3808 times. A site is cleared by reading the printed page itself (the page images are kept with the edition); where one is still open, the reading view shows the transcription's damaged characters, marked, rather than a guess.

Edition. The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject which was written by Proclus but since lost, by Thomas Taylor, 2 vols (London: printed for the author, 1816). This edition serves the Theology of Plato alone, over the two volumes the print gives it: vol. I entire, and vol. II only as far as the Theology runs in it (its printed pages 1-299). It stops there deliberately, and the printed volume does not: vol. II's next work is the Elements of Theology (its printed pages 301-441), which is a work of its own and already has its own edition in this library, and the treatises follow the Elements (On Providence and Fate, the Ten Doubts concerning Providence, and the Subsistence of Evil). Carrying vol. II on to the treatises would not serve this work; it would serve a second work twice.

The source page images. The edition’s whole scan — all 800 leaves of it — is stored with the edition and served, one image per leaf, at /texts/proclus-theology-of-plato-taylor-1816/scans/. The apparatus opens on them and browses every leaf of it in leaf order, so a leaf a reading was decided from can be opened beside the reading, and a leaf no reading used is readable all the same; the readings that carry no page image are listed in the apparatus in their own right. They are the Internet Archive's scan of this volume (item thomastaylor), a public-domain work like the transcription. The editorial layer over them — the repairs and their rationales, the page models, the apparatus — is the part released under a licence of its own; see the licence below.

What was done to the text. This paragraph is the MECHANICAL work, which changes presentation and never a byte: what the text is corrected by is the recorded rule list, described under "the repairs, as rules" below and inspectable in full in the reader's own repairs panel. Nothing here is corrected against the print or modernised — the rules repair the transcription's damage, they do not edit the edition, and the transcription view shows the pages with no rule applied. The mechanical work, and these are all of it — paragraphs break where the print leaves a blank line (3999 read, 3999 written, the same count); hard line breaks inside a paragraph are joined into one line, and runs of spaces collapsed to one; a word broken across a line break is rejoined, its hyphen taken as the printer’s break and dropped, except where the word before it is a compound that carries a hyphen or where the next line begins with a capital, and then the hyphen stays; and a short line that reads as a heading becomes one (2513 in this text, 1891 at top level). Whatever was not a heading is a paragraph, so no passage is lost.

How to read this page. The transcription runs in the order of the printed volume’s own pages, so the digitiser’s stamp, the title pages and the book’s own contents list stand where the book put them, before the text proper. The contents block at the head of the text jumps to any heading in it, and every passage that is not a heading is a paragraph, so no page of the volume is skipped over.

What the transcription gets wrong, and you will see. Measured on the text of this page: 5,795 words that mix an "f" with a "t"; 2,120 negation signs (¬) standing where the print has none; 601 of its 2,513 headings are a bare page number. These are the defects the repairs do NOT reach: a corrected text is a new edition, and this page is a transcription of a printed one whose damage is repaired only where a reading could be determined (see the repairs, below, for what is reached and what is left). What is left is left in place AND NAMED rather than deleted. A word that reads oddly is usually the transcription and not the edition: the long s of the print is frequently taken for an f, and a page number of the volume stands in the running text where the printer put it. Where a heading is a bare number it is the volume's own pagination, not a division of the work.

The edition this page carries. The same text is served here as an edition rather than only as prose: the document holds its 215 numbered sections, the 4 printed page numbers recovered from the volume’s own running heads and bare folios — 4 of them from a bare folio whose head’s words are gone, 0 interpolated between two numbered leaves, and 648 marker(s) left UNNUMBERED because no number could be read there — its 0 notes, every one of them defined with each of its 0 references resolved in both directions, and the whole text as one plain file for reading without scripts and for citing. The words served are the transcription, uncorrected; the repairs travel as rules rather than as a second text, so the difference between the two is a list anyone can read against the words that are served.

The contents list is generated. The printed volume has no contents page — nothing stands between its title page and its first division — so the 215 entries above are generated from the divisions the edition itself makes, each titled with its own opening words and each carrying the printed page it opens on. The opening words of 3 of those divisions are damaged in the transcription by more than the repairs can restore, and those entries state the gap instead of showing damaged words as a title: the transcription’s own words stand beside the entry, and no title is invented for it.

The repairs, as rules. Every repair the reading view makes is a recorded rule applied to the transcription’s own words — 0 for the divisions, 0 for the numbers and note markers the transcription wrote through an OCR digit confusion, and 3271 for the damaged words whose reading this edition RECORDS (3808 applications in this text) — 3808 applications of those rules in all, each rule firing at least once (a rule that fires nowhere is caught before this page is produced, not shipped as machinery nothing reads). The reader’s own list of repairs shows each rule, the words it changes, why, and how many times it fires — that list IS the difference between the two views, so the repairs can be checked against the transcription word by word. The policy is: a recorded reading is substituted, and where none is the transcription’s own characters stay. The reading view therefore shows the print’s word where one is recorded and the transcription’s damage where none is, and that surviving damage is counted in TWO classes, stated apart because they are different things: 551 damaged word(s) no rule resolved, shown with the damage still in them and named in the reader’s repairs list under “damaged words left visible”, and 68 standalone marker(s) — one or more damage characters standing as their own token BETWEEN words (a lost space, or the scanner’s debris) — which are NOT words and are not counted as any. Between them they account for every one of the 1186 damage character(s) the reading view still shows, over the text the reading view renders (the note definitions and the unlabelled paragraphs included). Every one is marked, so a reader can see that it is damage and not a typo by the author. Where a reading is not determinable from this transcription, a rule records that decision (0 rule(s), action “leave”) instead of deleting the marker and saying nothing, and a damaged word no rule names is left the same way. The damage set the marking uses was MEASURED on this transcription (every character standing inside a word of it that its own print cannot set there), not guessed: it is stated once, in the shared base policy every text's rules are written under. No rule removes a damage character without recording a reading; a rule that did would make the edition say something it does not, which is the one thing this architecture exists to prevent.

Where it is cited. The essays on the blog whose subject is this work: proclus-theology-of-plato. The link goes out to the essay — the texts stand on their own; the essays are one reader’s reading — and a passage can be checked against the edition it was taken from.

Attached readings. proclus-theology-of-plato — essays on the blog, linked out.

Licence. The transcription is public domain; the editorial work — repairs, page models, apparatus, notes — is CC-BY-4.0. The transcriptions are public-domain works. The editorial work — repairs, page models, apparatus, notes — is released under CC BY 4.0. See about for the full statement.

1. SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS — 3603 paragraphs
2. CHAPTER XXXIII. — 396 paragraphs